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PAUL F. KIRGIS *

The Contractarian Model of
Arbitration and Its Implications for
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards
In an article that appeared as alternative dispute resolution, or
ADR, was emerging as a topic of mainstream legal consideration,
Paul Carrington addressed the different understandings of the
1
“alternative” in ADR. He postulated that proponents of ADR unite
under the banners of three primary aversions. First, some proponents
2
seek an alternative to law itself. They resist the formalism and
rigidity of legal solutions to personal and social problems. Second,
3
some proponents seek an alternative to professionalism in law. They
dislike the adversarialism that attorneys seem to bring to dispute
resolution. Third, some proponents seek alternatives to traditional
4
adjudicative procedures. They distrust a judicial system that they see
as inefficient and callous to the real needs of participants.
Within the spectrum of ADR techniques, arbitration seems largely
a response to the third concern. The disputants who favor arbitration
are not necessarily averse to law and legal solutions, and they
typically embrace lawyers as dispute resolution professionals. What
they often want to avoid is the formality of traditional adjudicative
process. In particular, they usually want a process made less
*
Professor, St. John’s University School of Law. I am grateful to Chris Borgen, Elaine
Chiu, Michael Perino, Susan Stabile, Brian Tamanaha, Stephen Ware, and Tim Zick for
their helpful comments on this project, and to Dora Jimenez for her invaluable research
assistance.
1 See Paul D. Carrington, Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 298 (1984).
2 Id. at 298.
3 Id.
4 Id.

[101]
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expensive through decreased use of pleadings, discovery, and
motions, and they want a decision made by a professional with
5
expertise in a field rather than by a lay jury.
However, arbitration also carries the potential to respond to the
first concern: the concern regarding the use of law to resolve
disputes. According to one conventional way of thinking about the
6
law, it is primarily a set of rules supplying norms of behavior. Those
rules may be more or less determinate, and they may derive from any
of a number of sources. But there seems to be broad consensus, at
least among the public, that legal rules exist, that they constitute “the
law,” and that the job of legal actors is to consistently and fairly apply
those rules.
Sometimes disputants want to avoid the rules that a court would be
likely to apply to their dispute. For example, trading partners in a
commercial relationship may want their dispute resolved by reference
7
to industry custom rather than generally applicable rules of law. If
they went to court, they could not be assured that the rules of their
choice would be applied. By choosing arbitration, they can pick an
8
arbiter who is more likely to apply those rules. To the extent the
parties empower the arbitrator to decide their dispute without
reference to the legal rules that a court would be likely to invoke, they
make arbitration an alternative to law.
That scenario assumes that the parties have roughly equal
bargaining power and are in a relationship that they expect to
continue. The use of arbitration to avoid legal rules seems benign in

5 See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of
Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2243-47 (1993).
Disputants may also value arbitration for its promise of confidentiality. Id. at 2240.
6 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE
PERSPECTIVE 1 (1975).
7 See Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the
Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105, 124 (1997).
8 See EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, A LTERNATIVE D ISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 324 (2d ed. 2001) (“The theory of the
contracts to arbitrate New York textile disputes was simple—rather than go to court, let a
trusted, expert third party who was knowledgeable in the trade and industry customs
decide the dispute. Arbitrator expertise was primarily responsible for the success of these
textile arbitrations . . . .”); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 127 (1992)
(stating that arbitrators decide complex cases in the diamond industry primarily “on the
basis of trade custom and usage”); Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 846, 852-53 (1961) (explaining that the arbitrator’s awareness of trade
custom is a factor that enhances the predictability of arbitration).
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that situation. In other contexts, however, parties may seek to avoid
law in ways designed to advantage them or disadvantage their
contract partners. For example, many financial institutions would
prefer to be free of legal restrictions in their dealings with customers,
many employers would prefer to be free of discrimination laws, and
many doctors and hospitals would prefer to be free of medical
malpractice liability. These parties might jump at the chance to avoid
otherwise-governing legal rules by using arbitration instead of formal
adjudication. They might choose arbitration in the hope that an
industry-sensitive arbitrator will ignore or downplay otherwise
applicable legal rules favoring the weaker party. The prospect of
arbitration as a means to avoid law in these situations seems far less
palatable.
Arbitration has become increasingly common in cases involving
precisely those circumstances. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, arbitration was not widely used outside of commercial
9
disputes involving merchants. For a variety of reasons, not least the
rising cost of litigation, the use of arbitration expanded rapidly in the
10
second half of the last century. The United States Supreme Court
validated the use of binding contractual arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism in many situations in which the parties have
11
neither equal bargaining power nor an ongoing relationship. As a
result, arbitration became widespread in consumer disputes,
employer–employee relations, and virtually every other context in

9 See FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION : ITS HISTORY, F UNCTIONS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS 6 (Kennikat Press 1972) (1948); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach
to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1380 (1991) (“The United States Arbitration Act . .
. was written with the implicit assumption that it would be invoked by commercial actors
having relatively equal bargaining power and emotive appeal to a jury.”); Zeb-Michael
Curtin, Note, Rethinking Prima Paint Separability in Today’s Changed Arbitration
Regime: The Case for Inseparability and Judicial Decisionmaking in the Context of
Mental Incapacity Defenses, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1905, 1910-13 (2005) (explaining that
arbitration was limited to use among commercial actors at the time of the Federal
Arbitration Act’s (FAA) passage).
10 See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 167
n.11 (2003) (citing a report by the American Arbitration Association that “[f]rom 1990 to
2002, the AAA’s caseload increased 379 percent”).
11 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (allowing
arbitration for an employer–employee relationship); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (allowing arbitration for an
investor–broker relationship); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987) (allowing arbitration of RICO claims).
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which parties order their relations by contract. The potential for the
abusive avoidance of law increased correspondingly.
13
Despite a sustained chorus of academic concern, courts have
largely failed to acknowledge the potential for this abuse. They have
retained in the new contexts the strong presumption of deference to
arbitral awards that grew up around commercial and labor
14
In all cases today, even those such as employment
arbitration.
discrimination that involve important personal rights, courts resist
15
calls to review awards to ensure that arbitrators follow the law.
They pay lip service to the need for arbitration to protect those
16
rights, but without effective judicial review, there are no assurances
that arbitrators will get the law right.
The systemic decision to enforce arbitration awards without
meaningful review amounts to a policy choice. At least implicitly, we
believe that the benefits of an expedited dispute resolution mechanism
exceed the costs of a less thorough exploration of legal rights—even
in cases where the parties have radically different bargaining power.
This policy choice is backed by both analytical principle and legal
doctrine. The analytical principle is the familiar ideal of freedom of
contract. Courts venerate party autonomy. They tend to see extreme
deference to arbitral awards as necessary to protect the parties’ choice
12 Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1638-40 (2005).
13 See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived” and
Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 383 (1996) (arguing that the
“Gilmer dicision carries alternative dispute resolution to excess”); Robert A. Gorman, The
Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. I LL. L. REV.
635, 678 (fearing that the “Gilmer decision . . . represents the beginning of a potentially
vast reallocation of jurisdiction over employment disputes from civil courts and
administrative agencies to privately selected arbitrators”); Martin H. Malin, Privatizing
Justice—But by How Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 589, 627 (2001) (positing that “[i]f courts do not review employment arbitration
awards for errors of law, we risk transforming a system of public law into a system of
private justice”); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 731 (1999) (arguing that “the ‘ground’ for
inarbitrability must be judged [in each case] on its substance, not merely its label”). But
see Robert N. Covington, Employment Arbitration after Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come
to the United States?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345, 406-08 (1998) (willing to accept
the increased role of arbitration because it is a “finality-enhancing doctrine”).
14 See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 73-95 and accompanying text.
16 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) (“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum.”).

KIRGIS.FMT

2006]

7/24/2015 8:25 AM

The Contractarian Model of Arbitration

105

17

of arbitration as an alternative to adjudication. The legal doctrine
18
comes from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the primary statute
governing judicial oversight of arbitration. The FAA provides no
19
While courts
express authority for substantive review of awards.
have grafted some common-law grounds for review onto the FAA,
those grounds are extremely limited. Courts point to the FAA as
compelling extreme judicial deference to arbitral awards in all
contexts.
It is probably not possible to demonstrate empirically whether the
benefits of unreviewable arbitration exceed the costs, either in
20
individual cases or in the aggregate. Participant surveys might tell
some of the story, but too many intangible factors, such as the social
utility of public and formal adjudication, come into play to make such
a determination meaningful. At the end of the day, every policy
argument in favor of arbitration without judicial review can be met by
21
a contrary argument in favor of curtailing arbitration.
The fact that the policy debate has no clear resolution makes resort
to the principle of party autonomy and the doctrine of the FAA
critically important. Those who favor the current system of virtually
unlimited and unreviewable arbitration can forestall change—and
even avoid engaging in a sustained policy discussion—by falling back
on those defenses. While it is not possible to resolve the policy issues
finally, it is possible to assess whether the principle of party
autonomy, coupled with applicable legal doctrine, justifies the degree
of deference courts have adopted. That is what I attempt in this
Article. I argue that, at least in certain classes of cases, the principle
of party autonomy requires greater judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards.
I argue further that this result is doctrinally compelled by basic tenets
of contract law that operate independently of—and cannot be
preempted by—the FAA.
17 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (deferring
to “the unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when
selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in
the courts”).
18 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000 & Supp. II 2001-2003).
19 See id. § 10.
20 For a good recent exploration of the costs and benefits of arbitration both for
individuals and society, see Sternlight, supra note 12.
21 See Covington, supra note 13, at 404 (“[E]rrors in law are important and arbitration
opinions and awards should be subject to some sort of review. Finality of awards is also
important, however, and simply to state two important competing values does not itself
dictate how to strike a balance between them.”).
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In making these arguments, I rely on a particular model of
arbitration—what I will call the contractarian model—that seems to
22
In this
animate the modern judicial attitude toward arbitration.
model, the arbitrator is seen not as a substitute adjudicator, but as an
agent of the parties tasked with interpreting the terms of their
agreement. The arbitrator’s decision is treated as if it were a contract
term agreed upon by the parties. Since the award under this model is
the equivalent of a contract term, a court interested in promoting party
autonomy will hesitate to upset it. The court will focus on ensuring
that the new “term” was properly “agreed upon”—that is, that the
arbitrator did not exceed the scope of his agency and was not biased
in some way. And in fact, that is precisely the type of review
23
contemplated by the FAA.
Viewed in these terms, the ritual conclusion that enforcing awards
promotes party autonomy fails for two reasons. First, it assumes that
the parties mutually agreed to an arbitral decision that might ignore
their legal rights. In a contract of adhesion, we have no assurance that
22 Professors Edward Brunet and Stephen Ware have used the similar terms “contract
model” or “contractual approach” respectively, in reference to arbitration. Edward Brunet,
Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39,
46 (1999); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1002-06 (1996) [hereinafter Ware,
Arbitration and Unconscionability]. Professor Brunet refers to a “contract model” of
arbitration, which is characterized by adjudication-type procedures specified by the parties
in the agreement to arbitrate. He distinguishes this model from “folklore arbitration,”
which is characterized by equitable decisions made by experts in a particular field without
formal processes. Brunet, supra at 42-45, 47-51. Similarly, Professor Ware defines the
“contractual approach” to arbitration as encompassing three principles: (1) courts should
send parties to arbitration only where the parties agreed to arbitrate; (2) arbitration
agreements should be enforced except on grounds for revocation of a contract; and (3)
arbitrators should not be permitted to reach a result that the parties could not have reached
through contract. See Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, in BRUNET EL AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A C RITICAL
ASSESSMENT 88-126 (2006) [hereinafter Ware, Interstate Arbitration].
Despite the different emphases of their work, Professors Brunet and Ware both see a
trend toward judicial deference to the parties’ agreement as a hallmark of contract-based
arbitration. That is a trend I emphasize as well. I use the term “contractarian model” in a
more narrow way, however, to refer to attitudes toward the arbitrator’s role, and more
specifically, the nature of the award. I argue that, regardless of the terms of the agreement,
courts have come to see the award as equivalent to a contract term. I distinguish this
approach from one that views the award as equivalent to a judicial decision. I argue that
the choice of a model has consequences for the degree of judicial scrutiny to be expected.
Ultimately, I come to a conclusion close to Professor Ware’s third principle above: that
courts need to be more careful to ensure that awards do not violate basic rules of contract
law.
23 See 9 U.S.C. § 10.
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that assumption is justified. The weaker party may be quite surprised
to learn that an arbitrator can ignore the law without consequence.
Courts avoid facing that problem by pointing to the absence of a
24
But a more
meaningful standard of judicial review in the FAA.
probing doctrinal analysis reveals countervailing rules that compel
substantive judicial review of awards.
Understood through the perspective of the contractarian model, an
arbitrator’s award is the equivalent of a contract term agreed upon by
the parties. In some instances the decision ultimately rendered is
different from the one a court would have issued by applying rules of
law. If that decision is enforced, then the parties may be understood
to have waived the legal rights that would have been protected by the
application of the governing legal rule. In itself, this is not a radical
result. Most legal rules are waivable, in the sense that we allow
people to forgo the rights the rules would confer upon them if applied.
That sort of waiver is uncontroversial when it is a free and informed
choice and is done after the rights in question have matured.
It is a different thing to agree prospectively to forgo the rights that
a legal rule might confer in the future. When parties enter into an
arbitration agreement, they agree to abide by a decision to be made in
the future about a dispute that has not yet arisen. The waiver
occasioned by an arbitrator’s award in derogation of law is both
prospective, in the sense that it is made before the rights in question
have matured, and ill-informed, in that the party does not know the
effect of the waiver at the time it is made. This makes an “arbitral
waiver” an extraordinary legal consequence and one that contravenes
basic principles of contract law, at least in some situations.
To reach this conclusion is to conclude that the FAA cannot do the
heavy lifting in support of unreviewable arbitration that has often
been assumed. Section 2 of the FAA expressly incorporates state
contract law by requiring courts to enforce arbitration agreements
“save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
25
of any contract.” Interpreting this provision in Doctor’s Associates,
24 See, e.g., Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1987)
(stating that the only substantive review permitted under the FAA is into whether the
arbitrator interpreted the contract); Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d
743, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that “an arbitrator’s conclusions on substantive
matters may be vacated only when the award demonstrates a manifest disregard of the law
where the arbitrators correctly state the law and then proceed to disregard it, if the award is
otherwise irrational, or if any of the explicit grounds for vacation or modification set forth
in sections 10 and 11 of the Act are present”).
25 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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Inc. v. Casarotto, the Supreme Court held that “generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be
applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening” the
26
FAA. If contract law effectively requires that arbitrators follow the
law, as I will argue it often does, then the FAA cannot provide courts
license to decline review of arbitral awards.
With that, the debate returns to the principle of party autonomy.
Again, sometimes good reasons exist for enforcing arbitral decisions
that effectively waive legal rights. Parties may knowingly and
voluntarily choose arbitration precisely because they do not want their
disputes resolved through the application of legal rules.
For a variety of reasons, we have made a societal commitment over
the last several decades to promote alternative forms of dispute
27
We do not force people to litigate every dispute to a
resolution.
final judicial resolution; accordingly, we should also not make
arbitration into a parallel system of litigation. Where parties
genuinely want to resolve their dispute without resort to legal rules—
where they voluntarily and knowingly choose to avoid law—we
should normally let them do so. That is, after all, frequently what
settlement entails.
That conclusion amounts to no more than saying that informed and
voluntary waivers should be enforced. The problem is that in many
cases the parties do not intend to forgo their legal rights. They choose
arbitration because they want a more economical or more private
forum in which to resolve the legal disputes that might arise between
28
them. To enforce an arbitral award that is contrary to law in such a
case is to impose an uninformed and unanticipated waiver on one or
both parties. The real dilemma for courts is to distinguish the cases in
which the parties genuinely envisioned arbitration as an alternative to
law and those in which the parties wanted only an alternative to
formal adjudicative process. Those in the former category do not
require judicial review beyond that currently offered. But those in the
26 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (referring to section 2 of the FAA specifically). See also
Sternlight, supra note 12, at 1644-45 (arguing that contractual and common-law
approaches have been more successful than constitutional or federal statutory arguments
challenging arbitration clauses); Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability, supra note 22,
at 1008-10 (explaining that after Doctor’s Associates, state unconscionability law would
be applied to the FAA).
27 See generally Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424 (1986) (providing a history of, and
the rationale behind, the growth of ADR in the 1970s and ’80s).
28 See Bernstein, supra note 5, at 2240-43.
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latter category require some heightened standard to ensure a basic
degree of compliance with law.
In order to avoid embroiling courts in factual disputes about the
parties’ prearbitration intentions, I will suggest that the selection of a
standard of judicial review turn on objectively identifiable criteria.
Those criteria should be used to determine a presumptive standard of
review. This standard would apply in the absence of a clear
manifestation of intent by the parties to select some other standard.
The criteria should include considerations of bargaining power, the
nature of the parties’ relationship, and the legal rights and obligations
at stake.
I will begin my analysis with a brief overview of the evolution of
judicial attitudes toward arbitration. I will show both how courts have
come to accept arbitration in virtually all contexts and how they have
adopted a posture of extreme deference to awards. With that
background in place, I will discuss the two competing models of
arbitration—the first viewing arbitration as private adjudication and
the second viewing it as a species of contract. I will then explain why
the contractarian model better represents modern judicial attitudes
toward arbitration. Next, I will discuss the law governing waivers of
legal rights through contract to show how deference to arbitral awards
can contravene generally applicable rules of contract formation.
Finally, I will return to the topic of party autonomy and suggest a
framework that courts can use in identifying the appropriate standard
of review for awards.
I
ARBITRATION IN THE COURTS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF R APID CHANGE
In the last one hundred years, courts in the United States moved
from an attitude of skepticism towards arbitration to an attitude that
validates agreements to arbitrate and defers to arbitrators as agents of
the parties. The result is a modern dispute resolution environment in
which arbitration agreements are enforced in virtually all contexts and
arbitral awards are almost universally upheld.
A. Common Law Attitudes Toward Arbitration
Private arbitration predates the public court system. Early Roman
and English law relied primarily on self-help; when parties mutually
desired an adjudicated resolution to a dispute, they went to an
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29

arbitrator. Arbitration has, therefore, historically functioned as an
adjudicative dispute resolution mechanism.
As the public court system arose and matured in England, it
displaced private arbitration in providing the primary adjudicative
function.
Arbitrators represented unwelcome competition for
common-law judges, whose compensation was tied in part to court
30
Judges thus had powerful incentives to increase their
fees.
31
jurisdiction and stifle competing dispute resolution mechanisms.
As a result, until the twentieth century, courts tended to view
arbitration skeptically. They typically refused to enforce agreements
to arbitrate on the ground that the parties could not “oust” the court of
32
its jurisdiction.
Once parties voluntarily submitted a dispute to arbitration, courts
33
treated the resulting award as a binding obligation. But that did not
29 See 14 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A H ISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 187 (A.L. Goodhart &
H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. 1956).
30 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 241 (1979).
31 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 211 n.5 (1956) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (noting that English courts fought “for extension of jurisdiction—all of
them being opposed to anything that would altogether deprive every one of them of
jurisdiction”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32 See Thompson v. Charnock, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1310 (K.B.) (Kenyon, C.J.) (“It is
not necessary, now, to say how this point ought to be determined if it were res integra, it
having been decided again and again that an agreement to refer matters in difference to
arbitration, is not sufficient to oust courts of law and equity of their jurisdiction.”); Kill v.
Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.); Vynior’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B.).
Early American courts adopted the same rule and maintained it throughout the nineteenth
century. See Meacham v. Jamestown, Franklin & Clearfield R.R. Co., 105 N.E. 653 (N.Y.
1914) (Cardozo, J.) (“If jurisdiction is to be ousted by contract, we must submit to the
failure of justice that may result from these and like causes. It is true that some judges
have expressed the belief that parties ought to be free to contract about such matters as
they please. In this state the law has long been settled to the contrary.”); Hurst v.
Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868) (“Such stipulations [to arbitrate] are regarded as
against the policy of the common law, as having a tendency to exclude the jurisdiction of
the courts, provided by the government with ample means to entertain and decide all legal
controversies.”) .
33 See Tankersley v. Richardson, 2 Stew. 130, 132 (Ala. 1829) (“The adjustment of
controversies and suits by arbitration, is a species of remedy much favored by legislation;
so much so, that, not only what can be, is intended in its favor, but it will not be permitted
to be impugned for any extrinsic cause; unless it be founded in corruption, partiality, or
other undue means.”); Brush v. Fisher, 38 N.W. 446, 448 (Mich. 1888) (“Courts . . . favor
awards made by tribunals of the parties’ own choosing, and are reluctant to set them aside,
and every presumption will be made in favor of their fairness, and the burden of proof is
upon the party seeking to set them aside, and the proof must be clear and strong.”)
(citations omitted); Winship v. Jewett, 1 Barb. Ch. 173, 184-85 (N.Y. Ch. 1845) (“[T]he
award, if made in good faith, is conclusive upon the parties . . . . Neither will it constitute
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mean that awards were enforceable as judgments. Where a losing
party to arbitration refused to comply with the award, the prevailing
party’s only option at law was to sue in either assumpsit or debt to
34
recover on the obligation. That option was little better than suing
35
on the underlying dispute. A better alternative was to sue in equity
36
for specific performance of the obligation.
A losing party seeking to avoid its obligations under an award had
37
no option at law. Its only choice was to seek specific relief from the
38
obligation in a court of equity. The equity courts analogized to the
law of contract. They held that they could overturn an award only on
the grounds for rescission of a contract, most notably fraud or
39
Most courts
mistake, or on a showing of bias by the arbitrator.
applying that standard gave great deference to arbitrators’ awards,
summarily rejecting attempts to vacate awards not supported by
40
strong evidence of fraud or partiality.

any defence [sic] . . . to show that after the award had been published, [the arbitrator]
dissented from it.”).
34 See Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the
American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 447 (1984).
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See Newland v. Douglass, 2 Johns. 62, 63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806) (“The evidence was
inadmissible, and a suit at law will not lie to re-examine the merits of an award. A court of
chancery may correct a palpable mistake or miscalculation made by the arbitrators, or
relieve against their partiality or corruption. But there is no such remedy at law, in a case
of submission, not within the statute.”) (citations omitted).
38 See Herrick v. Estate of Belknap, 27 Vt. 673, 683-84 (1854) (“We may here, perhaps,
look into the general rules of decision in courts of equity, which must govern this case.
The claim put forth in the bill, being either mistake or fraud in the estimates, is one clearly
of equity cognizance. Fraud, accident, and mistake form appropriate branches of the
general jurisdiction of the court of chancery in England and in this state.”).
39 See id.
40 See, e.g., Davy’s Ex’rs v. Faw, 11 U.S. 171, 174 (1812) (“[J]udges chosen by the
parties themselves as well as those who are constituted by law, ought to be exempt from
all imputation of partiality or corruption; . . . corrupt motives are not lightly to be ascribed
to the arbiter, nor is partiality to be attributed to him on account of difference of opinion
with respect to the decision he has made.”); Port Huron & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Callanan, 34
N.W. 678, 679 (Mich. 1887) (“There is power in a court of equity to relieve against
awards in some cases where there has been fraud and misconduct in the arbitrators, or they
have acted under manifest mistake, and perhaps in some defined and undefined cases. But
it is evident that there are great objections to any general interference by courts with
awards.”); Campbell v. Western, 3 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 84 (Ch. 1832) (declining to vacate
award on grounds of legal error in the admission of evidence where there was no evidence
of fraud or bias).
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A significant number of nineteenth-century courts sitting in equity,
however, used mistake grounds to exercise relatively extensive
41
While simultaneously affirming the
review of arbitral awards.
power of arbitrators to decide disputed questions of law and of fact,
these courts vacated awards for mistakes of law and fact provided the
42
mistake appeared on the face of the award. In the words of Justice
Story:
In regard to a mistake of the arbitrators, it may be in a matter of
fact, or in a matter of law. If, upon the face of the award, there is a
plain mistake of law, or of fact, material to the decision, which
misled the judgment of the arbitrators, there can 43
be little or no
reason to doubt that courts of equity will grant relief.

Story emphasized that a mistake of law would constitute grounds
44
for relief only if the arbitrators intended to rely on the legal rule. In
contrast, “[i]f they admit the law, but decide contrary thereto upon
principles of equity and good conscience,” the award could not be set
45
aside. Furthermore, arbitrators’ decisions “upon a doubtful point of
law, or in a case where the question of law itself is designedly left to
46
their judgment and decision, will generally be held conclusive.” In
those latter two situations, no “mistake” would have been made, so no
ground for vacatur would exist.
This doctrine of mistake gave courts, as a practical matter,
relatively broad leeway to overturn awards. For example, in Tillard’s
47
Lessee v. Fisher, the plaintiff brought an ejectment action to recover
property from the defendant, who had occupied the disputed property
for more than twenty years. The arbitrators found for the plaintiff.
The court set aside the award as being contrary to law on its face
because the arbitrators failed to recognize the running of the statute of
48
limitations.
41 But see Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 350 (1855) (“Courts should be careful to
avoid a wrong use of the word ‘mistake,’ and, by making it synonymous with mere error
of judgment, assume to themselves an arbitrary power over awards.”).
42 See, e.g., Kleine v. Catara, 14 F. Cas. 732 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 7869); White
Star Mining Co. v. Hultberg, 77 N.E. 327 (Ill. 1906); Heuitt v. State ex rel. Brown, 6 H. &
J. 95 (Md. 1823) .
43 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY J URISPRUDENCE § 1453, at 791 (11th
ed. 1873).
44 Id. § 1455, at 792.
45 Id. § 1455, at 792-93.
46 Id.
47 3 H. & McH. 118 (Md. 1793).
48 Id. at 121.
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By refusing to enforce arbitration agreements and imposing a
relatively robust doctrine of review of arbitral awards, eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century common-law courts signaled a faith in traditional
legal forms and a suspicion of alternatives. In keeping with the public
sentiment of the time, these courts venerated both common-law
49
process and, more importantly, the jury. For them, the loss of a jury
50
The
trial was the loss of one of the most fundamental rights.
prospective waiver of such a fundamental right was anathema, and it
was simply disallowed.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act and the Courts’ Reaction
51

In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act with the
express purpose of abrogating judicial resistance to the enforcement
52
The FAA confers a right to apply to a
of arbitration agreements.
federal district court to enforce an arbitration agreement in a “contract
53
evidencing a transaction involving [interstate] commerce.” A party
seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement may move to compel a
54
Alternatively, a party
reluctant party to proceed with arbitration.
may move to stay litigation if litigation has already been
55
The FAA also provides a mechanism for judicial
commenced.
56
enforcement of awards. The ways courts reacted to the provisions
requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements and the provision for
enforcement of awards reveal their evolving attitudes toward
arbitration.

49

See supra note 32 for examples of these cases.
See Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235, 243 (1819) (“[T]his Court would
ponder long, before it . . . produced a total prostration of the trial by jury, or even involved
the defendant in circumstances which rendered that right unavailing for his protection.”).
51 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
When enacted, the FAA was called the United States
Arbitration Act. Kenneth F. Dunham, Sailing Around Erie: The Emergence of a Federal
General Common Law of Arbitration, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 197, 205 (2006).
52 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995) (“[T]he basic
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts’ refusals to enforce
agreements to arbitrate.”).
53 9 U.S.C. § 2.
54 Id. § 4.
55 Id. § 3.
56 See id. § 9.
50
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1. The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements
For a number of years after the enactment of the FAA, courts
continued to see arbitration as, at best, a second-class alternative to
formal adjudication. Consequently, they initially interpreted the FAA
57
narrowly. The Supreme Court’s 1953 decision in Wilko v. Swan is
the most prominent example of that mindset. Wilko addressed the
application of the FAA to a dispute arising under the securities laws.
An investor argued that he should not be required to arbitrate his
fraud claims against a brokerage despite the existence of an
58
He based this
arbitration clause in his brokerage agreement.
argument on a provision of the Securities Act of 1933 declaring void
any “condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring
59
any security to waive compliance with any provision” of the Act.
He argued that arbitration “lacks the certainty of a suit at law under
the Act to enforce his rights” and that the arbitration clause
effectively waived compliance with the provision of the Act
conferring concurrent jurisdiction on the district courts and state
60
courts.
The Supreme Court refused to compel arbitration of the Securities
61
Act claims. The Court focused on the inadequacy of arbitration as a
62
substitute for formal adjudication. Notably, it never contemplated
that an arbitrator would be free to ignore the law. Instead, the Court
emphasized that the arbitrators would not have a judge to instruct
63
It further stated that even conceding arbitrators’
them on the law.
obligation to apply the law, they would be under no obligation to
produce a reasoned opinion allowing for meaningful judicial
64
On that basis, the Court held that the Securities Act
review.
65
precluded enforcement of the arbitration agreement.
During this period, the Court threw its support behind arbitration in
cases that did not involve statutory claims. The Steelworkers trilogy

57 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
58 Id. at 429.
59 Id. at 430 n.6, 432.
60 Id. at 432-33.
61 Id. at 438.
62 Id. at 436-37.
63 Id. at 436.
64 Id. at 436-37.
65 Id. at 438.
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cemented arbitration as the primary mechanism for resolving labor–
66
Further, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
management disputes.
67
Conklin Manufacturing Co. confirmed the broad enforceability of
arbitration agreements in commercial cases by holding that even the
issue of fraud in the inducement of the agreement to arbitrate must be
68
decided by the arbitrator.
Still, the Court remained hesitant about enforcing arbitration
agreements where statutory rights were at issue. Alexander v.
69
Gardner-Denver Co. seemed to reinforce Wilko’s antipathy toward
the arbitration of statutory claims. In Gardner-Denver, an employee
covered by a collective bargaining agreement had arbitrated an
70
employment discrimination grievance. The arbitrator ruled against
him, and he then filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights
71
Act of 1964. The Supreme Court held that the arbitration did not
affect his right to file suit because the claims arising under the
bargaining agreement were “distinctly separate” from the statutory
72
claims. The Court concluded that “[a]rbitral procedures, while well
suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a
comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights
73
created by Title VII.” In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted
several reasons why arbitration is an inferior procedural forum.
These included arbitrators’ potential lack of specialized legal
knowledge, the informality of arbitration procedures, and the absence
74
of mandatory written opinions.
Faced with a clash between the Steelworkers trilogy’s principle of
arbitrability of labor disputes and Wilko’s principle of nonarbitrability
of statutory claims, the Gardner-Denver Court followed Wilko. The
Court saw the statutory rights at issue as too important to commit to
an inferior alternative process, even if that process arose out of a
collective bargaining agreement. But the Court’s reticence did not
75
last long. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., decided the same year as
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
Id. at 403-04.
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Id. at 40-42.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 56.
See id. at 57-58.
417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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Gardner-Denver, a German citizen sought to enforce an arbitration
agreement after he was sued by an American company for fraud
76
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
Supreme Court held the agreement enforceable and distinguished
Wilko. The Court concluded that the nature of the statutory rights at
issue was different because the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
implied a private right of action whereas the Securities Act of 1933
77
It also found an important
expressly provided a “special right.”
distinction in the fact that the transaction in Scherk involved parties to
an international agreement, whereas Wilko involved a private U.S.
78
citizen suing other U.S. citizens.
Because the Scherk Court refused to overturn Wilko, it left an
anomaly in which claims asserted under the Securities Act of 1933
were not arbitrable, but claims asserted under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 were arbitrable. It also left the Court’s position on
arbitrability generally unclear. The Court seemed to announce a
policy in Scherk favoring arbitration even in statutory cases. At the
same time, it seemed to backtrack in Gardner-Denver from its
established policy of favoring arbitration in labor disputes.
By the mid-1980s, however, the composition of the Supreme Court
had changed, and beginning with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
79
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court firmly committed itself to
arbitrability in virtually every context. Mitsubishi, like Scherk,
involved a dispute arising out of an international commercial
80
But instead of securities fraud, the claims alleged
agreement.
81
The Supreme Court held the antitrust claims
antitrust violations.
arbitrable, finding that the statutory rights at issue could be
82
Two years later, in
“effectively vindicated” in arbitration.
83
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the Court extended
Scherk by enforcing an arbitration clause in a case alleging gardenvariety fraud claims against a securities broker under the Securities

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 509.
Id. at 513-14.
Id. at 515.
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
Id. at 616-17.
Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 636-37.
482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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84

Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO. Two years after that, in
85
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the Court
finally put Wilko to rest by holding claims under the Securities Act of
86
1933 arbitrable. And in the 1991 case Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
87
Lane Corp., the Court enforced an arbitration clause in a dispute
involving employment discrimination claims under the Age
88
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. That decision crippled
Gardner-Denver, without overruling it, by limiting it to cases
involving parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement. In
each of these decisions, the Court rejected the “suspicion of
arbitration” and emphasized arbitration’s effectiveness in vindicating
89
statutory rights.
Since the early 1990s, the Court has remained steadfast in its
support for arbitration as an alternative to formal adjudication. It has
recognized only one limitation on arbitrability: cost. In Green Tree
90
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, a home purchaser argued
that she should not have to arbitrate her fraud claims against her
91
lender. She asserted that the cost of arbitration would be so high it
would dissuade her and others like her from taking action to enforce
92
statutory rights. The Supreme Court found a lack of evidence in the
record to show how expensive arbitration would be, but it
acknowledged that a claim of this type might have validity: “It may
well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a
litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal
93
statutory rights in the arbitral forum.” Lower courts have relied on
Green Tree to refuse enforcement of fee-splitting provisions in
arbitration clauses that would have the effect of imposing costs on

84 Id. at 223.
The aggrieved investors alleged “fraudulent, excessive trading on
respondents’ accounts and . . . making false statements and omitting material facts from
the advice given to respondents.” Id.
85 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
86 Id. at 485 (explicitly overruling Wilko).
87 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
88 Id. at 35.
89 See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30; McMahon, 482
U.S. at 226.
90 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
91 Id. at 83-84.
92 Id. at 84.
93 Id. at 90.
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arbitration claimants that would exceed the court costs a litigant
94
would be likely to face.
In sum, over the last two decades the Supreme Court has removed
virtually every obstacle to arbitration. Any claim, including statutory
claims under the discrimination laws, is potentially arbitrable. And
any party, including those with radically unequal bargaining power,
can be held to an arbitration agreement. The only current limitation
appears to be cost. The stronger party apparently may not force the
weaker to bear the cost of the arbitration if that cost would deter the
other party from seeking vindication of important legal rights.
These developments represent a dramatic change in the way courts
view themselves and the judicial dispute resolution system. The
Supreme Court no longer sees arbitration as an inferior substitute for
formal adjudication. To the contrary, it has embraced the alternative
to the very system at whose pinnacle it sits. Indeed, the Supreme
Court seems to prefer arbitration to adjudication.
2. The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
The starting point for discussion of standards of judicial review of
arbitral awards is the FAA, which in section 10 contains a list of four
grounds for vacating arbitral awards:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the
95
subject matter submitted was not made.

94 See, e.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding that a fee-splitting clause requiring claimant to pay one-half of arbitration
costs “failed to provide an accessible forum in which [claimant] could resolve his statutory
rights”).
95 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000 & Supp. II 2001-2003).
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Because the Supreme Court has held that the FAA preempts
96
virtually all state arbitration law (absent an express agreement by
97
the parties to invoke it), and because section 10 appears on its face
to provide the exclusive grounds for vacating awards, no other test of
judicial review seems necessary.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and every circuit court have
found grounds for overturning awards that are not specifically
98
mentioned in section 10. Three separate, non-statutory grounds for
review have emerged: the “essence” test, the public policy test, and
the test for legal error usually formulated in terms of “manifest
disregard” of the law.
The “essence” test comes from United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
99
Wheel & Car Corp., one of the cases in the Steelworkers trilogy, in
which the Court said that an “award is legitimate only so long as it
100
By
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.”
that, the Court apparently meant that the award must be arguably
contemplated by an agreement and not simply contrived by the
arbitrator from other sources.
As the Court said in United
101
Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc.:
[T]he arbitrator’s award settling a dispute with respect to the
interpretation or application of a labor agreement must draw its
essence from the contract and cannot simply reflect the arbitrator’s
own notions of industrial justice. But as long as the arbitrator is
even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within

96 See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003) (holding that the “FAA
encompasses a wider range of transactions than those actually ‘in commerce’”); AlliedBruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995) (holding that FAA
reaches any contract “affecting” interstate commerce); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (holding that state law invalidating certain arbitration agreements
violates the Supremacy Clause).
97 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Board of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989) (noting that “the FAA’s primary purpose [is] ensuring that private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms”).
98 The “exceeded powers” clause of section 10 is arguably broad enough to encompass
a wide range of grounds for vacating awards, and some courts have referred to it in
applying what are essentially judicially derived standards of review. See Stephen L.
Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration
Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 756-62 (1996). For purposes of this Article, I treat any test
not explicitly stated in section 10 as a non-statutory ground.
99 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
100 Id. at 597.
101 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
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the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed
102
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.

Lower courts have elaborated. The Fifth Circuit has said that, for
an award to draw its essence from a contract, it “must have a basis
that is at least rationally inferable, if not obviously drawn, from the
letter or purpose of the . . . agreement. . . . [T]he award must, in some
logical way, be derived from the wording or purpose of the
103
contract.”
Awards have been found not drawn from the essence of a contract
primarily when the arbitrator ignored the plain language of the
104
agreement. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Teamsters Local 243, the
Sixth Circuit refused to enforce an award granting reinstatement to
employees when an arbitrator ignored plain language in their
105
The arbitrator awarded back pay to the
employment contract.
employees whose jobs had been subcontracted out even though plain
language in the contract gave the employer the right to subcontract
106
The court emphasized that “an arbitrator may construe
work.
ambiguous contract language, but lacks authority to disregard or
107
Because most
modify plain or unambiguous contract provisions.”
disputes do not involve contract language that is unambiguous, the
essence test seldom provides a basis for overturning awards.
In addition to validating the essence test, Misco recognized and
refined a second non-statutory ground for reviewing awards: public
108
The Court in Misco upheld an arbitrator’s award
policy.
reinstating an employee who had been discharged for violating a
109
company rule against possession of drugs on company property.
The employee had been caught in the backseat of a car in the
102

Id. at 38.
Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th
Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
104 683 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1982).
105 Id. at 155.
106 Id.
107 Id. (citing Detroit Coil v. Int. Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 594 F.2d
575 (6th Cir. 1979); Local Union No. 89 v. Hays & Nicoulin, 594 F.2d 1093 (6th Cir.
1979); Amanda Bent Bolt v. UAW Local 1549, 451 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir. 1971)).
108 Initially, “public policy” was used as a means to review awards by the Court in
1983. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int’l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum
& Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (holding that “a court may not enforce a
collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy”) (citing Hurd v. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948)).
109 United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 33-35 (1987).
103
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company parking lot with marijuana smoke in the air and a lighted
110
The Court first
marijuana cigarette in the front-seat ashtray.
concluded that none of the express grounds in section 10 warranted
vacating the award because there was no evidence of affirmative
111
Then it acknowledged that an award
misconduct by the arbitrator.
might be set aside even in the absence of those grounds if it violated
112
public policy.
113
The Court had mentioned the public policy ground before, and
114
lower courts had applied it for years.
But much confusion existed
about the nature of the policy that had to be violated in order to justify
vacatur. Some lower courts had been vacating awards based on
generalized conclusions that the award contravened amorphous public
115
The Court in Misco explained that such a policy
policy goals.
must “be ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal precedents
116
and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.’”
117
It also required that the award “explicitly conflict” with that policy.
The Court recognized that it might be a bad idea to allow employees
to work with heavy machinery when they have used drugs on
company property. But it concluded that the arbitrator’s award to that
118
effect did not conflict with any clearly defined public policy.
119
In Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, the
Court refined the public policy test further while refusing to vacate an
award reinstating a truck driver who twice tested positive for
120
The Court addressed whether sufficient grounds for
marijuana.

110 Id. at 33. However, the arbitrator had refused to consider that evidence because it
was discovered after the decision to terminate had been made. Id.
111 Id. at 40.
112 Id. at 43 (“[A] court may refuse to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement when
the specific terms contained in that agreement violate public policy.”).
113 See W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766.
114 See Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on Public Policy
Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 91, 95 (2000)
(collecting seventy-three cases between 1960 and 1988 where the public policy argument
was the primary claim).
115 Id. at 101-15 (discussing how different circuit courts deal with the public policy
argument generally).
116 United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987) (quoting
Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 44-45.
119 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
120 Id. at 65-66.
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vacatur are present when an award is “contrary to public policy as
ascertained by reference to positive law” or whether the award must
121
The Court refused to adopt
affirmatively “violate” positive law.
122
However, it emphasized the
the latter standard as a firm rule.
narrow scope of the public policy ground and suggested that it would
be very rare for an award to warrant vacatur on public policy grounds
123
It concluded that the award did not
without violating positive law.
merit vacatur because neither Congress nor the relevant regulatory
agencies had expressly prohibited an employer from allowing an
124
employee who tested positive for drugs to remain on the job.
Eastern Associated Coal establishes an extremely narrow ground
for public policy review of arbitral awards. Apparently, a party
seeking to vacate an award will have to identify a specific rule of law
violated by the award. In other words, the party must show that the
award, if made a contract term, would have rendered the contract
unenforceable as illegal. That is a high burden to meet. In fact, very
few cases since Eastern Associated Coal have found public policy
grounds sufficient to vacate awards, and most of these have come
125
from state courts.
The essence test and the public policy test deal with the extreme
cases in which an arbitrator either ignores contract language or enters
an award that directly violates a rule of positive law. Nevertheless,
most courts, including the Supreme Court, have indicated a
willingness to consider arguments that an award is legally wrong,
even if it is derived in some way from contract language and does not
violate public policy. A number of formulations have emerged for
identifying remediable arbitral error in these circumstances including
“manifest disregard,” “completely irrational,” and “arbitrary and
capricious.” By far the most commonly employed is the “manifest
126
disregard” test, which originated in dicta in Wilko.
121

Id. at 63.
Id. at 67.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 66-67.
125 See Chicago Fire Fighters Union Local No. 2 v. City of Chicago, 751 N.E.2d 1169
(Ill. App. Ct. 2001); City of Brooklyn Center v. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., 635
N.W.2d 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Buffalo Police Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Buffalo,
830 N.E.2d 308 (N.Y. 2005).
126 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The only circuit not to adopt
some form of the manifest disregard test is the Seventh Circuit. See George Watts & Son,
Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001). The court in Watts did not conclude
122
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In responding to the argument that arbitration provided an
equivalent process to adjudication, the Court in Wilko reiterated the
limits of judicial review of arbitral awards: “interpretations of the law
by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject . . .
127
The Court thus
to judicial review for error in interpretation.”
suggested that awards demonstrating “manifest disregard”—whatever
that might entail—could be vacated. The Court recently reaffirmed
the manifest disregard test, again in dicta, in First Options of
128
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.
The lower courts have been highly inconsistent in applying the
129
manifest disregard standard.
Most have applied the test to
questions of law. That is, they vacate awards upon a showing that the
130
More
arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law.
specifically, most of these courts require evidence of a conscious
decision by the arbitrator to decide contrary to a clearly applicable
governing rule. The Second Circuit has explained:
The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and
instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an
arbitrator.
Moreover, the term “disregard” implies that the
arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal
principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it. . . . The
governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators must
131
be well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.

Some courts have invoked standards of review focusing not on the
arbitrator’s conscious failure to follow governing legal rules, but on
the rationality of the award. For example, in Swift Industries, Inc. v.

that the manifest disregard test does not exist; it simply concluded that the test is
functionally equivalent to the public policy test as elaborated in Eastern Associated Coal.
Id. at 580.
127 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (emphasis added).
128 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
129 See Watts, 248 F.3d at 579-80 (discussing inconsistencies in case law and referring
to Supreme Court application of the manifest disregard standard as “opaque”).
130 See Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of
the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 471-72 (1998). Some courts have gone even further and
suggested that manifest disregard might be grounds for vacating an award demonstrating a
clear factual error. See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998).
131 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d
Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n arbitration panel does not act in manifest
disregard of the law unless (1) the applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not
subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators refused to heed that legal principle.”).
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132

Botany Industries, Inc., the Third Circuit vacated an award because
of its “complete lack of rationality” after concluding that the
agreement could not be read to allow for the type of award the
133
In that form, the irrationality test looks much
arbitrator granted.
134
like the “essence” test from Enterprise Wheel.
Courts have occasionally discussed rationality in the context of
alleged errors of law, but they have refrained from vacating awards on
135
At most, they have sometimes remanded for additional
that basis.
explanation where an award appears irrational on its face and lacks
136
In Sargent v. Paine Webber, Jackson &
any stated rationale.
137
Curtis, Inc.,
for example, the district court for the District of
Columbia concluded that “a court should not attempt to enforce an
138
The court went
award that is ambiguous, indefinite or irrational.”
on to state that “[a]lthough a court is precluded from overturning
errors in factual determinations, ‘nevertheless, if an examination of
the record before the arbitrator reveals no support whatever for his
139
determinations, his award must be vacated.’” The court remanded,
directing the arbitrator to explain an award that granted the claimants
140
less than twenty percent of their apparent losses.

132

466 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1135. See also Lentine v. Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633, 634 (N.Y. 1972) (holding
that “[s]ave for ‘complete irrationality’, arbitrators are free to fashion the applicable rules
and determine the facts of a dispute before them without their award being subject to
judicial revision.”).
134 See Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988)
(treating the “completely irrational” test and the “essence” test as equivalent); Indus. Mut.
Ass’n v. Amalgamated Workers, Local Union No. 383, 725 F.2d 406, 412 (6th Cir. 1984)
(conflating the two tests); Detroit Coil Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, Lodge #82, 594 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir. 1979) (requiring that the arbitrator’s
award draws its “essence” from the collective bargaining agreement and that it is “derived
in some rational way from the collective bargaining agreement”).
135 See, e.g., Bettencourt v. Boston Edison Co., 560 F.2d 1045, 1049 (1st Cir. 1977)
(finding no “manifest error of law” sufficient to warrant vacating award).
136 See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 105-06 (1997).
137 674 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1987).
138 Id. at 922.
139 Id. (quoting NF&M Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 524 F.2d 756, 760 (3d Cir.
1975)).
140 Id. at 921.
133
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C. Current Trends and Conclusions
Lower courts seem to be hearing an increasing number of
challenges to arbitral awards. In particular, challenges asserting that
awards are in manifest disregard of the law have increased markedly
since the Supreme Court reaffirmed that test in its 1995 decision in
First Options. In the five years from 1990 through 1994, an average
of just under seven reported federal district court decisions per year
discussed manifest disregard as a ground for vacating an arbitral
141
In the five years from 2000 through 2004, that number
award.
more than doubled to almost seventeen reported district court
142
decisions per year.
Although the number of cases raising manifest disregard seems to
be increasing, it remains extremely rare for courts to vacate awards on
that ground. Of the reported cases in the periods from 1990 to 1994
and 2000 to 2004, not a single district court vacated an award on
141 These figures were derived from Westlaw searches in the federal district courts
database. Bankruptcy courts are included. I searched for cases covered by West’s key
number for judicial review of arbitral awards in which the term “manifest disregard”
appears. In some of the cases, the courts simply referred to manifest disregard as one
possible basis for vacating an award, even though no party relied on manifest disregard to
challenge the award in question.
142 Based on Westlaw searches of the federal district court database the number of
reported district court decisions discussing “manifest disregard” as a ground for judicial
review of arbitral awards for each year from 1990 through 2004 are as follows:

YEAR
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990

NUMBER OF DECISIONS
16
21
16
15
15
15
18
13
9
8
7
8
6
6
7
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143

manifest disregard grounds.
Two courts vacated awards on other
grounds tied to arbitrator irrationality, but both were reversed on
144
Several other courts remanded cases to the arbitrators for
appeal.
145
clarification.
A handful of circuit courts have vacated awards on manifest
146
disregard grounds, sometimes affirming unpublished district court
147
Undoubtedly a number of other district courts also
decisions.
vacated awards without publishing opinions. But it seems clear that
only a small fraction of challenges to awards based on manifest
disregard and related standards succeed, and few even receive
meaningful review.

143 However, courts vacated awards on other grounds. See Ass’n of Flight Attendants v.
Aloha Airlines, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1206 (D. Haw. 2001) (determining that award
did not draw its essence from the contract because it was issued by only one member of
the panel of arbitrators); NCR Corp. v. CBS Liquor Control, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 168, 175
(S.D. Ohio 1993) (finding that arbitrator exceeded powers); In re Arbitration Between
Household Mfg., Inc. & Kowin Dev. Corp., 822 F. Supp. 505, 510 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(finding that arbitrator awarded same amount of damages to single party twice); A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCullough, 764 F. Supp. 1365, 1371 (D. Ariz. 1991)
(determining that party procured award by “undue means” by making blatantly false
statements of law); Kerr-McGee Refining Corp. v. Triumph Tankers Ltd., 740 F. Supp.
288, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that arbitrators exceeded their power).
144 See Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725-26 (S.D.
Miss. 2003) (vacating damage award by arbitrator because its calculation was “arbitrary
and capricious”), rev’d, Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 376 F.3d 377 (5th Cir.
2004); Wonderland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29
(D. Mass. 2001) (vacating after finding no “tenable ground” for the acceleration of an
award), vacated with an order to enforce the arbitral award, Wonderland Greyhound
Park, Inc. v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 274 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2001).
145 See Lummus Global Amazonas, S.A. v. Aguaytia Energy del Peru S.R. Ltda., 256 F.
Supp. 2d 594, 650 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Weinberg v. Silber, 140 F. Supp. 2d 712, 724 (N.D.
Tex. 2001); Collins & Aikman Floor Coverings Corp. v. Froehlich, 736 F. Supp. 480, 48788 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
146 See Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec., L.L.C., 341 F.3d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 2003)
(finding that “since 1960 we have vacated some part or all of an arbitral award for
manifest disregard in . . . four out of at least 48 cases where we applied the standard”)
(quoting Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d
Cir. 2003) (alteration in original).
147 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 843, 845 (6th Cir. 2003);
Gas Aggregation Servs., Inc. v. Howard Avista Energy, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 1060, 1069 (8th
Cir. 2003).
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II
FROM ADJUDICATION TO CONTRACT: TWO MODELS OF
ARBITRATION
As arbitration has become an increasingly pervasive feature of the
dispute resolution landscape, two theories, or models, of arbitration
148
These models, which I will refer to as the
have emerged.
adjudicatory model and the contractarian model, inform the way
courts perceive and respond to arbitration. I will sketch each of the
models in order to show how the contractarian model seems to better
account for modern judicial attitudes toward arbitration.
A. The Adjudicatory Model
There is a natural tendency, particularly among courts, to
conceptualize arbitration as simply a private version of court
adjudication. The Supreme Court, in an 1855 decision, expressly
equated arbitration with private adjudication, declaring that
“[a]rbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters
149
Modern legal
submitted to them, finally and without appeal.”
scholars often discuss arbitration in those terms as well. In their
seminal article Adjudication as a Private Good, William Landes and
Richard Posner discuss arbitration as the primary modern example of
150
They note that “[a]rbitrators typically apply
private adjudication.
the same rules as courts deciding similar questions” and go on to
compare arbitration to adjudication as a way of assessing the
151
It seems not to occur to them to
efficiency of adjudication.
understand arbitration as anything other than a substitute for formal,
public adjudication.
The distinctive feature of court adjudication is its focus on legal
rights and obligations. Courts find facts and then apply rules of law
to determine those rights and obligations. An observer who
148 The first scholarly discussion of the two models of arbitration appeared in 1927,
shortly after the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act opened the door to broad
enforcement of arbitration agreements. See Nathan Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial
Arbitration, 40 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1927). Lon Fuller suggested a similar dichotomy
between arbitrators who act as private adjudicators and those who see themselves as
conciliators unrestrained by procedural limitations. See Lon L. Fuller, Collective
Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 WIS. L. REV. 3, 3-4.
149 Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1855).
150 See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 30 (arguing that private adjudication can
provide a beneficial model for public adjudication).
151 Id. at 249-53.
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understands arbitration as a substitute for formal adjudication will
expect the arbitrator to act like a judge in finding facts and applying
rules of law. This is an approach that the Supreme Court adopted
152
153
Wilko is a good example.
during the early years of the FAA.
The Court in Wilko refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate
154
claims under the Securities Act of 1933.
The Court dismissed
arguments that an arbitrator could protect legal rights with the same
competence as a court, but it did not take issue with the basic
155
characterization of the arbitration process as a substitute for trial.
It assumed that the arbitrators would function essentially as lower
156
courts and simply rejected arbitration as an inadequate substitute.
Justice Frankfurter, writing in dissent, made this understanding
explicit, though he reached a different outcome as to the case’s
157
Concluding that arbitration could effectively
arbitrability.
vindicate rights under the Securities Act, he described the FAA as
impelled by “the advantages of providing a speedier, more
economical and more effective enforcement of rights by way of
158
arbitration than can be had by the tortuous course of litigation.”
When courts like the one in Wilko look at an arbitration, they see
one or more aggrieved claimants demanding a decision as to which
party is in the right and which is in the wrong. They see facts to be
determined and rules to be applied. Their fundamental concern is
with the arbitrator’s capacity to vindicate legal rights in a manner
commensurate with a court’s.
B. The Contractarian Model
As natural as the private adjudication model might seem, it is not
the only way to conceptualize arbitration. Arbitration may also be
understood as a species of contract. In the contractarian model, the
arbitrator is not an adjudicator tasked with finding facts and applying
generally applicable legal rules. The arbitrator is instead the parties’

152

See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
154 Id. at 436-37.
155 See id. at 435-36.
156 See id. at 437-38 (discussing and rejecting arbitration as an alternative “forum” for
resolving the parties’ dispute).
157 Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 439-40.
153
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agent, tasked with interpreting their agreement once they reach an
impasse. The prominent labor scholar Theodore St. Antoine
described the contractarian model in these terms:
Put most simply, the arbitrator is the parties’ officially designated
“reader” of the contract. He (or she) is their joint alter ego for the
purpose of striking whatever supplementary bargain is necessary to
handle the anticipated unanticipated omissions of the initial
agreement. Thus, a “misinterpretation” or “gross mistake” by the
arbitrator becomes a contradiction in terms. In the absence of fraud
or an overreaching of authority on the part of the arbitrator, he is
speaking for the parties, and his award is their contract. . . . In sum,
the arbitrator’s award should be treated as though it were a written
stipulation by the parties setting forth their own definitive
159
construction of the labor contract.

Again, in this model, the arbitrator does not act as a substitute
judge. The arbitrator is a surrogate for the parties, supplying the
terms left out of their initial agreement. The arbitrator’s focus is on
giving efficacy to the parties’ agreement rather than on deciding who
is right and who is wrong.
The contractarian model has inspired arbitration’s proponents for
many years. Its first scholarly exegesis appeared in a 1927 article in
160
The author contrasted the “legalistic
the Harvard Law Review.
view” of arbitration, which focuses on the arbitrator’s adjudicative
role, with the “realistic view,” which understands the arbitrator as
161
He pointed out the
modifying the parties’ substantive relationship.
tendency of businessmen to adopt the realistic view instead of the
162
Consistent with that theme,
legalistic view favored by the courts.
Herbert Harley, then Secretary of the American Judicature Society,
emphasized commercial arbitration’s focus on the relationship over
the law in a 1916 Bulletin of the Society. He noted that “[i]n the law
the rendering of exact justice in the matter presented is a final aim.
But in business the settlement of a given dispute is not the most
important thing. The big thing is the relationship between the
163
parties.”
This understanding of arbitration’s role seems to have animated the
FAA. The FAA was the product of the ABA’s Committee on
159 Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second
Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1977).
160 Isaacs, supra note 148.
161 Id. at 929.
162 Id. at 938.
163 J ULIUS HENRY C OHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 18 (1918).
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164

Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law.
It was drafted by
lawyers for businessmen who intended arbitration to be used to
resolve disputes among businessmen. Their focus was not on the
adjudication of substantive rights, but on the resolution of day-to-day
disputes that arise in the course of a commercial relationship. The
principal drafter and proponent, Julius Henry Cohen, described
arbitration under the FAA in these terms:
Not all questions arising out of contracts ought to be arbitrated. It is
a remedy peculiarly suited to the disposition of the ordinary
disputes between merchants as to questions of fact—quantity,
quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of payment,
excuses for non-performance, and the like. It has a place also in the
determination of the simpler questions of law—the questions of law
which arise out of these daily relations between merchants as to the
passage of title, the existence of warranties, or the questions of law
which are complementary to the questions of fact which we have
just mentioned. It is not the proper method for deciding points of
law of major importance involving
constitutional questions or
165
policy in the application of statutes.

Cohen saw arbitration as a vehicle for resolving the routine
disputes that arise between commercial trading partners as they
perform their contractual obligations. He never contemplated that
arbitration would take the place of adjudication in the determination
of substantive legal rights.
Although Cohen never expressly
discussed these models, his understanding of arbitration seems much
closer to the contractarian model than to the adjudicatory model. His
understanding is also consistent with the narrow grounds of judicial
review allowed by the FAA. If arbitrators are not acting in an
adjudicatory capacity, then there is no need for courts to review their
166
work in search of errors of law.
The Supreme Court implicitly adopted the contractarian model of
arbitration, at least for labor cases, in United Steelworkers v.
167
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.
Enterprise Wheel involved the
168
arbitration of a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement.

164 See IAN R. MACNEIL, A MERICAN A RBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 41 (1992).
165 Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265, 281 (1926).
166 See Ware, supra note 13, at 729-31.
“The entire FAA embodies a strongly
contractual approach to arbitration law.” Id. at 729.
167 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
168 Id. at 595.
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In the arbitration, the union represented several employees who had
169
The arbitrator reinstated them
been fired for walking off the job.
and awarded back pay, even though the collective bargaining
170
The
agreement had expired prior to the issuance of the award.
employer refused to comply with the award, arguing that it was
unenforceable because the employees were no longer covered by the
171
The union sought enforcement in
collective bargaining agreement.
172
the district court, which refused to upset the arbitrator’s award.
The court of appeals, however, agreed with the employer that the
arbitrator could not grant relief for the period after the expiration of
the collective bargaining agreement and vacated that portion of the
173
award.
The Supreme Court reversed on that issue, holding that the court
had no power to review the merits of the award. Its reasoning on that
relatively uncontroversial point is significant:
The collective bargaining agreement could have provided that if
any of the employees were wrongfully discharged, the remedy
would be reinstatement and back pay up to the date they were
returned to work. Respondent’s major argument seems to be that by
applying correct principles of law to the interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement it can be determined that the
agreement did not so provide, and that therefore the arbitrator’s
decision was not based upon the contract. The acceptance of this
view would require courts, even under the standard arbitration
clause, to review the merits of every construction of the contract. . .
. [T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator’s
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator’s
decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no
business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract
174
is different from his.

The Court treated the arbitrated issue not as a dispute calling for
some form of adjudicatory decision, but as an aspect of the parties’
ongoing contractual relationship. In keeping with the contractarian
model, the Court focused on the terms of the agreement rather than on
the determination of substantive legal rights.

169
170
171
172
173
174

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 595-96.
Id. at 598-99.
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Other recent cases, both in the Supreme Court and the circuit
courts, seem also to have employed the contractarian model. In
175
Eastern Associated Coal, the Supreme Court refused to vacate an
award reinstating a truck driver who twice tested positive for
176
The Court noted that the parties had “‘bargained for’
marijuana.
the ‘arbitrator’s construction’ of their agreement” and concluded that
it had to “treat the arbitrator’s award as if it represented an agreement
between [the employer] and the union as to the proper meaning” of
177
The Court was echoing Judge Easterbrook,
the contract’s terms.
who, in a 1986 opinion emphasizing the limits of judicial review of
arbitral awards, argued that “the [FAA] restricts the court to
ascertaining that the arbitrator was a faithful agent of the contracting
178
parties.”
These decisions all addressed labor disputes, and indeed the
contractarian model seems most obviously applicable in labor and
179
Moreover, while cases like Wilko invoke the
commercial cases.
adjudicatory model where arbitration of statutory rights is at issue,
180
The
this approach to judicial review has been repudiated.
approach courts take to judicial review of arbitral awards today—not
just in the labor or commercial contexts but in all cases—indicates an
attitude toward arbitration that is more consistent with the
181
The deference
contractarian model than the adjudicatory model.
courts pay to arbitrators goes far beyond the deference they pay to
lower courts or even to administrative bodies. Courts flatly say that

175

E. Associated Coal Corp. v. UMW Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
Id. at 60-61.
177 Id. at 61-62 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 599 (1960)).
178 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Ind. Ass’n of E. Chicago,
Inc., 790 F.2d 611, 619 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
179 In the Steelworkers trilogy, the Supreme Court distinguished between commercial
arbitration, which it characterized as a substitute for litigation, and labor arbitration, which
it characterized as a substitute for labor strife. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
180 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989)
(overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
181 Stephen L. Hayford, Unification of the Law of Labor Arbitration and Commercial
Arbitration: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 781, 863 (2000) (“The
Supreme Court now views the FAA as establishing a preemptive body of federal law
strongly favoring the enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate. It sees
commercial arbitration ‘strictly as a matter of contract’ and considers the role of the courts
to be one of simply giving effect to the intent of parties who agree to arbitrate future
disputes.”) (citation omitted).
176
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they will not vacate an arbitral award for legal or factual error even if
182
Today, in practice, arbitrators in all cases are
the error is gross.
treated as agents of the parties rather than as deputized semipublic
referees.
The conceptual shift toward a contractarian model of arbitration is
consistent with the trend toward what Judith Resnik has called
183
Judges increasingly see their role as
“Contract Procedure.”
promoting and enforcing private contracts for the resolution of
disputes rather than as ensuring that litigants receive due process.
The move toward Contract Procedure appears in the encouragement
184
the growth of
of judicial participation in settlement negotiations,
185
and the
judicially sanctioned alternative dispute resolution,
186
Its
devolution of dispute resolution from courts to agencies.
consequence is a new role for judges, whose job is no longer to decide
cases but to manage a party-driven and largely unstructured
bargaining process. The contractarian model of arbitration is part and
parcel of this broader shift. Judges operating under the contractarian
model do not see the arbitrator as a surrogate judge who must apply
rules guaranteeing due process as a judge would. Instead, the
arbitrator is the parties’ representative who must be given free rein to
formulate an effective pragmatic resolution.
Neither the adjudicatory nor the contractarian model is “correct,”
and I do not mean to suggest that courts presented with the choice
would invariably subscribe to the contractarian model instead of the
adjudicatory model. The models simply provide alternative ways of
thinking about arbitration; the same court may employ one model in
one case and the other model in a different case. My contention is
that the contractarian model better explains the standard of review
contained in the FAA and the usual behaviors of judges reviewing
arbitral awards.
It also meshes better with larger trends in
adjudicative procedure. For these reasons, it provides a useful
perspective from which to analyze and evaluate the relationship
between arbitration and law.
182

See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38 (1987).
Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 598 (2005)
(“While Procedure was once concerned about generating secondary rules by which to
render judgment, today the task is to shape secondary rules for interpreting parties’
agreements . . . .”).
184 See id. at 611-17.
185 See id. at 619-21.
186 See id. at 621-22.
183
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III
THE LAW OF CONTRACT AND THE WAIVER OF L EGAL R IGHTS
THROUGH ARBITRATION
Courts have the power to validate or invalidate arbitration and
other ADR processes as alternatives both to formal adjudication and
to law. When courts enforce agreements to arbitrate, at a minimum
they signal their acceptance of arbitration as an alternative to formal
adjudicative process.
187
Common-law courts refused to enforce arbitration agreements.
They saw formal adjudicative process as such an essential right that
they would not allow a party to prospectively waive the right to
formal adjudication. Today, courts are under explicit directions from
the Supreme Court to enforce arbitration agreements. The Supreme
Court no longer sees the waiver of formal adjudicative process as the
waiver of a fundamental right, and it has validated arbitration as an
188
As a consequence, the Supreme Court has
alternative in that sense.
allowed arbitration to expand into every corner of the law. As a
practical matter, any dispute is arbitrableclaim is potentially subject to
binding contractual arbitration, regardless of the legal rights and legal
rules the disputeit implicates.
That raises the question of the extent to which arbitration can serve
as an alternative to law. The Supreme Court has said unequivocally
that statutory rules, especially those that create substantive rights, do
apply in arbitration. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler189
Plymouth, Inc., the case that opened the floodgates to arbitration,
the Supreme Court expressly declared that parties do not forfeit
statutory rights by agreeing to arbitrate: “By agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
190
The Mitsubishi Court held antitrust claims
than a judicial, forum.”

187 See Donald E. Johnson, Has Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson Exterminated
Alabama’s Anti-Arbitration Rule?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 577, 579-80 (1996) for a brief history
of the common-law view of arbitration.
188 As I suggested above, with respect to arbitration as an alternative to legal process,
the only real limitation is cost. A stronger party may not condition access to arbitration for
a weaker party on the expenditure of costs that would be significantly greater than required
for court adjudication. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90
(2000). Beyond that, however, the process options are virtually unlimited.
189 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
190 Id. at 628.
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191

arbitrable.
The Court later reiterated that principle in Rodriguez de
192
193
194
McMahon, and Gilmer,
cases upholding arbitration
Quijas,
of statutory claims under RICO, the federal securities laws, and the
ADEA. In theory, then, parties have a presumptive right to the
enforcement of statutory rules in arbitration. An arbitrator does not
have the prerogative to disregard the statutory rights and liabilities
that a judge would be obligated to take into account.
In practice, however, the right to the application of statutory rights
195
means little because of the deference courts give to arbitral awards.
For instance, an award that would result in an illegal restraint of trade
would be unenforceable under the narrow public policy ground
enunciated in Eastern Associated Coal because it would direct the
parties to violate the law. That is an easy case because the law
contravened by the award exists to protect the public. Where the
statutory rules at issue exist primarily to protect individual
participants, however, courts almost never vacate even when an error
of law is obvious. For example, in DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
196
Inc., the arbitrators awarded plaintiff compensatory damages under
the ADEA but refused to grant him attorneys’ fees even though the
ADEA expressly mandates the award of attorneys’ fees to a
197
The Second Circuit concluded that because
successful plaintiff.
the arbitrators did not know that attorneys’ fees were statutorily
198
It enforced
required, there was no manifest disregard of the law.
199
the award.
DiRussa is an unusual case in two respects. First, the arbitrators
200
disclosed their failure to follow the law on the face of the award.
Most arbitral awards do not contain explanations at all, and the ones
that do typically do not make the errors appear so obvious. For that
reason, it is often impossible for a court to evaluate an award for legal
error even if the court is so inclined. Second, courts operate within a
legal framework that discourages them from finding legal error, so
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

Id. at 636-37.
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987).
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
See Ware, supra note 13, at 725.
121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 822.
Id. at 822-23.
Id.
Id. at 823.
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they tend to describe awards in terms that make the award sound
201
This tendency makes it very difficult to identify the
rational.
reported decisions in which arbitrators made significant errors in
applying legal rules.
It is simply impossible to know the extent to which arbitrators
misapply or fail to apply governing statutory rules in the great run of
cases that never reach a judge or that do not contain errors made as
202
apparent as the error in DiRussa.
But we can assume that
arbitrators frequently apply statutes in ways that appellate courts
would conclude constitute reversible error. The available empirical
studies show that many arbitrators consciously choose to ignore legal
203
And we can assume based on the
rules at least some of the time.
reversal rates for trial courts that those arbitrators who attempt to
apply the law make relatively frequent mistakes.
Take discrimination as an example. While comprehensive data on
reversal rates is not readily available, it appears that between twentyfive and thirty percent of appeals in civil rights cases result in a
204
Even if many of these reversals are for
reversal, a remand, or both.
procedural errors, trial judges must be making significant numbers of
legal errors in applying federal civil rights statutes. Arbitrators
almost certainly are not better at applying statutes than trial judges.
205
They must make reversible mistakes at least as often.
Given current standards of arbitral review, there is simply no
assurance that statutory rules will be applied at all, much less applied
in the way a judge would apply them. As a practical matter,
arbitration can be a vehicle for avoiding the law. This is true whether
the parties have equal bargaining power and knowingly choose to
201 See, e.g., Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Parra, 269 F. Supp. 2d 519, 526 (D. Del. 2003). The
arbitrators in Parra refused to award prejudgment interest, apparently in contravention of
governing Delaware law. Id. The court upheld the award, taking pains to paint the award
as legally defensible: “[C]redible arguments can be made that, under both Federal and
Delaware law, prejudgment interest is not mandatory in all circumstances and the
arbitrators could have viewed themselves, and apparently did view themselves, as free to
exercise discretion in that regard.” Id.
202 A thorough empirical study might be able to determine this, but such a study is
probably impossible given the confidentiality constraints that typically apply in arbitration.
203 See Ware, supra note 13, at 719-20 (summarizing studies).
204 These figures were generated through Westlaw searches of federal circuit court
appeals raising issues under Title VII and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act and under the
Americans with Disabilities Act for the ten years from 1995 through 2005.
205 See, e.g., Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1011
(10th Cir. 1994) (“Arbitration provides neither the procedural protections nor the
assurance of the proper application of substantive law offered by the judicial system.”).
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forgo legal rights or whether one party agrees to a contract of
adhesion with no real understanding of the rights he or she may be
sacrificing. In at least some cases, this use of arbitration to avoid law
amounts to a prospective waiver of legal rights that basic rules of
contract law proscribe.
A. The Prospective Waiver of Legal Rights Under Contract Law
As the Supreme Court first began to free arbitration from the
boundaries of collective bargaining agreements and commercial
disputes, it expressed concern about the possible waiver of important
legal rights. That concern appears most prominently in Alexander v.
206
Gardner-Denver Co., in which the Court held that the submission
of an employment discrimination claim to arbitration did not cut off
207
The Court concluded that “an
the right to sue under Title VII.
employee’s rights under Title VII are not susceptible of [sic]
208
prospective waiver.”
Since Gardner-Denver, the Court has changed its stance. It now
sees enforcing agreement terms as part of its job and the job of courts
in general. It has taken this to mean enforcing awards under virtually
all circumstances as long as the arbitrator did not stray from the
“essence” of the contract. The only limitation the Court has imposed
is the very narrow public policy ground that seems to apply only
when the award would require a party to break the law.
This approach is consistent with the Court’s adoption of a
contractarian model of arbitration. The Court equates enforcing an
agreement with enforcing an award because it sees the arbitrator as
the parties’ agent for interpreting the agreement. Under this model,
the arbitrator’s award is understood to be equivalent to a contract term
agreed upon by the parties ex ante. The plaintiff in DiRussa, for
example, can be understood as having agreed to waive his statutorily
prescribed right to attorneys’ fees in the event he proved that his
employer discriminated against him. By enforcing the award, the
Court upheld that “bargain” despite the Supreme Court’s assurances
that statutory rights should be protected in arbitration. As a practical

206
207
208

415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Id. at 56-57.
Id. at 51-52.
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matter, the Court allowed the parties to avoid the application of the
209
law by contracting around it.
The lynchpin of this model is the parties’ assent. Courts seem
untroubled by the possibility that an arbitrator might misapply or fail
210
The
to apply the law because that is what the parties agreed to.
problem with this approach is that it assumes far greater liberty of
contract than actually exists. Parties cannot contract to break the law.
More importantly for arbitration purposes, though, is that parties often
cannot contract to waive their own legal rights. The law governing
such “exculpatory contracts” has important ramifications for the law
211
These
of arbitration that the courts have failed to recognize.
ramifications call into question the validity of arbitration as an
alternative to law.
Contractual agreements to shift risk go by many different labels,
212
I use the term
including waiver, release, and indemnification.
exculpatory contract to cover any situation in which one party to a
contract agrees to relieve another party of liability for harms resulting
from the conduct of the latter. Exculpatory contracts, in this sense,
typically take the form of releases or waivers of rights or defenses.
213
and
Traditionally, exculpatory contracts have been disfavored,
in certain situations they are per se unenforceable. The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts states flatly that “[a] term exempting a party
from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is
214
The rule is not
unenforceable on grounds of public policy.”
209 See Ware, supra note 13, at 726. “When courts confirm arbitration awards that
make errors of law, parties lose the substantive rights that would have been vindicated by
an application of the law.” Id.
210 See Edward Brunet, The Core Values of Arbitration, in BRUNET ET AL., supra note
22, at 3.
211 It is important to note that the FAA does not preempt state law on exculpatory
contracts. The FAA preempts state law applying specifically to arbitration, but it does not
preempt generally applicable state contract law. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492
(1987). “[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law
arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts
generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a
contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of [9 U.S.C.] § 2.”
Id. at 493 n.9.
212 See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993),
for helpful definitions of waiver, release, and indemnification.
213 See, e.g., Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 783 (Colo. 1989)
(“Agreements attempting to exculpate a party from that party’s own negligence have long
been disfavored.”) (citing Jones v. Walt Disney World Co., 409 F. Supp. 526, 528
(W.D.N.Y. 1976); Harris v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 917, 919 (Ill. 1988)).
214 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(1) (1981).
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limited to physical harms, so it would apply to agreements purporting
to absolve a party from such intentional harms as discrimination and
215
Exculpatory contracts are also unenforceable where they
fraud.
216
would relieve a seller from strict product liability.
Exculpatory contracts that relieve a party from liability for its own
negligence are enforceable within limits. One of those limits applies
in the employment arena: a contract may not relieve an employer
217
from liability for its negligence that injures an employee.
Another
limit applies to common carriers, who may not exempt themselves
from liability for their own negligence toward members of the public
218
whom they serve.
Beyond those situations, courts typically evaluate a number of
factors in deciding whether to enforce exculpatory contracts that
relieve a party from its unintentional torts. For example, the Colorado
Supreme Court has identified four factors to consider: “(1) the
existence of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service
performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly entered into; and (4)
whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and
219
Other courts list different factors, but
unambiguous language.”
most seem to be looking for the same basic things. They are reluctant
to enforce exculpatory agreements where the party relieved of
liability is performing a public service, where there is a serious
disparity in bargaining power, or where the exculpatory term is
ambiguous or hidden.
The most important case addressing exculpatory contracts relating
to public services is Tunkl v. Regents of the University of
220
In Tunkl, the UCLA Medical Center required a patient
California.
to sign a release upon admission that relieved the hospital “from any
and all liability for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its
215 See 15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS : CONTRACTS C ONTRARY
TO P UBLIC P OLICY § 88.8 (2003).
216 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 214, § 195 cmt. c. See
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS : PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 14.
217 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 214, § 195(2)(a).
218 See id. § 195(2)(b) (explaining that a term exempting “one charged with a duty of
public service from liability to one to whom that duty is owed for compensation for breach
of that duty” is unenforceable).
219 Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981) (citing Rosen v. LTV Recreational
Dev., Inc., 569 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1978)); Barker v. Colo. Region- Sports Car Club, Inc.,
532 P.2d 372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Threadgill v. Peabody Coal Co., 526 P.2d 676 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1974); Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 177 N.E.2d 925 (N.Y. 1961).
220 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
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221

employees.”
The patient’s wife sued the hospital, alleging that he
died as a result of the malpractice of doctors employed by the
222
223
The hospital sought to enforce the release of liability.
hospital.
The California Supreme Court stated the rule that an exculpatory
224
It identified
clause that affects the public interest is unenforceable.
a number of factors to consider in determining whether an activity is
in the public interest, including the importance to the public of the
service performed, whether the exculpated party holds itself out to the
public, the economic setting of the transaction, and whether the
225
injured party placed itself in the control of the exculpated party.
The court concluded that the hospital was providing a public service
226
and refused to enforce the release.
Unequal bargaining power used to be almost universally
227
acknowledged as grounds for invalidating an exculpatory clause.
One leading case was Miller’s Mutual Fire Insurance Association v.
228
Parker, which addressed an attempt by a parking garage to limit its
229
liability for its negligence when a car was stolen from the garage.
230
It found
The court refused to limit the garage owner’s liability.
unequal bargaining power due to the fact that people wishing to park
in that part of town frequently could not find parking on the street and
231
had no choice but to use a parking garage.

221

Id. at 442.
Id.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 443.
225 Id. at 445-46.
226 Id. at 447. Other courts have also held that the provision of medical treatment is a
public service for which exculpatory clauses are unenforceable. See, e.g., Leidy v. Deseret
Enters., Inc., 381 A.2d 164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (practicing physical therapy); Olson v.
Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977) (doctor performing an abortion).
227 See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 446 n.13. In the law of unconscionability more generally,
unequal bargaining power is often the key ingredient in a finding of procedural
unconscionability. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 214, §
208 cmt. d (“[G]ross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably
favorable to the stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved
elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no
meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the
unfair terms.”).
228 65 S.E.2d 341 (N.C. 1951).
229 Id. at 344.
230 Id.
231 Id.
222
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Relying on that case and some earlier cases, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts stated that exculpatory clauses would not be
enforced “where there is such disparity of bargaining power between
the parties that the agreement does not represent a free choice on the
232
The third Restatement, however, is more
part of the plaintiff.”
circumspect, saying only that “[w]hen an individual plaintiff
passively accepts a contract drafted by the defendant, the contract is
construed strictly, favoring reasonable interpretations against the
233
Following this approach, modern courts seem less
defendant.”
inclined to categorically reject exculpatory contracts where the parties
234
are of unequal power.
Even if it is not sufficient to invalidate an agreement, the risk of
unequal bargaining power leads courts to scrutinize the language of
exculpatory agreements. Many require that a contract use the word
“negligence” if it is to be construed as limiting liability for
235
The New York Court of Appeals has held that “unless
negligence.
the intention of the parties is expressed in unmistakable language, an
exculpatory clause will not be deemed to insulate a party from
236
The Supreme Court of Texas
liability for his own negligent acts.”
has applied a broad “fair notice” requirement, which includes both a
requirement that the agreement expressly disclaim liability for
237
Other
negligence and also a “conspicuousness requirement.”
courts decline to require that the word “negligence” be used but
238
demand a “clear and unequivocal” expression of mutual assent.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts reiterates that test, noting that
“[c]ourts normally construe exculpatory contracts strictly, finding that

232

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B cmt. j (1965).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d
(2000).
234 See, e.g., Crandall v. Bangor Sav. Bank, No. CV-98-239, 1999 Me. Super. LEXIS
304 at *5-6 (Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 1999) (“The law in Maine appears to be that where
contracts are presented on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis and the parties do not have equal
bargaining power, the contract may be interpreted to meet the expectations of the party in
the inferior bargaining position.”) (citation omitted).
235 See, e.g., J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Dover, 372 A.2d 540, 552 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1977).
236 Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (N.Y. 1979) (citations omitted).
237 Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993).
238 Jig the Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171, 177 n.7
(5th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
233
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the plaintiff has assumed a risk only if the terms of the agreement are
239
clear and unequivocal.”
In sum, courts are very reluctant to enforce contract terms that have
the effect of prospectively waiving a party’s legal rights or defenses.
They never enforce such exculpatory contracts when a party seeks to
absolve itself of liability for its intentional torts. They do enforce
exculpatory contracts relieving liability for negligence, but not where
the absolved party is performing a public service, as in the case of
common carriers and providers of medical services, or where the
parties are in an employer–employee relationship.
Finally,
exculpatory agreements must always be manifested in clear,
conspicuous, and unambiguous language.
B. Applying the Law of Exculpatory Contracts to
Awards

Arbitral

Courts’ uncritical acceptance of arbitral awards runs counter to the
law governing exculpatory contracts generally. Every time a court
refuses to disturb an award that would be considered remedial legal
error if issued by a judge, the court effectively sanctions the
240
Under the law of contracts,
prospective waiver of a legal right.
those waivers should be enforced only in limited circumstances.
However, courts confirm arbitral awards, many of which must be
contrary to law, without regard to circumstances.
The most problematic example of this tendency is the judicial
acceptance of arbitration of intentional tort claims. One area in which
arbitration is most commonly used is for disputes between securities
241
Many of these disputes involve
brokers and their customers.
claims for securities fraud, which is an intentional tort. Under
239 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 233, § 2, reporters’ note to cmt. d
(citations omitted).
240 Another way to understand the problem of waivers of rights in arbitration is through
the distinction between mandatory and default legal rules. Mandatory rules are rules that
parties cannot contract around. Default rules are rules that apply unless the parties specify
some different rule. See Ware, Interstate Arbitration, supra note 22, at 111. There is no
definitive list of mandatory legal rules. In practice, the way a mandatory rule is identified
is through a court’s refusal to enforce an exculpatory agreement waiving the rule’s
application. Because the law of exculpatory contracts gives substance to the mandatory–
default distinction, I have chosen to focus on contract doctrine and to avoid generalizing
using the mandatory–default labels.
241 See generally Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New
World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095 (1993) (discussing securities
arbitration generally).
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standard contract doctrine, a contract exculpating a broker from
liability for its fraud would be unenforceable. The federal securities
laws make that rule explicit. Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 declare void any contract provision
242
The Supreme
waiving compliance with any term of those acts.
Court relied on the former provision in Wilko to hold that fraud claims
243
under the 1933 Act were not arbitrable.
First in McMahon, and then in Rodriguez de Quijas, the Court
reversed itself and held arbitrable securities fraud claims arising under
both Acts as well as under RICO. It emphasized in both cases that the
parties were not waiving their substantive rights under the statutes by
244
But the Court has never faced
presenting their cases in arbitration.
up to the possibility of arbitral error in those cases. If arbitrators fail
to apply the law or misapply the law, and a court refuses to redress
the error, parties will have waived compliance with the substantive
terms of the statutes.
The same problem arises with respect to employment
discrimination, probably the most controversial growth area for
arbitration. Employment discrimination is an intentional tort. A party
must prove that there was a discriminatory motive for the injurious
245
The Supreme Court in Gilmer held that
employment practice.
246
employment discrimination claims under the ADEA are arbitrable.
Lower courts have extended arbitrability to discrimination claims
247
under the civil rights laws and the Americans with Disabilities Act.

242

15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 78cc(a) (2000).
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434 (1953), overruled by Rodiguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
244 See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 482-83; Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) .
245 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice.”).
246 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
247 See, e.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 886 (4th
Cir. 1996) (enforcing the arbitration clause that required the parties to arbitrate claims
under Title VII and the ADA); Sheth v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., No. 04 C 4280, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2457, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2005) (granting employer’s motion to compel
arbitration when the employee alleged discrimination under Title VII); Valdes v. Swift
Transp. Co., 292 F. Supp. 2d 524, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting defendant’s motion to
dismiss and ordering arbitration of plaintiff’s Title VII claims).
243
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Again, however, the courts have dismissed the problem of arbitral
248
error in these cases. Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp. is a
good example. The plaintiff in Brown had filed a race discrimination
249
Prior to its resolution, he was
claim with the EEOC.
250
He then filed suit in district court for discrimination
terminated.
and retaliation, but the district court compelled arbitration pursuant to
251
The arbitrator
an arbitration clause in his employment contract.
subsequently denied him relief, and the plaintiff sought vacatur of the
award on manifest disregard grounds, arguing that the arbitrator
252
Both
applied the wrong legal test in assessing his retaliation claim.
the district court and the Eleventh Circuit upheld the award because
the plaintiff had not shown that the arbitrator was conscious of the
law and deliberately ignored it. The Eleventh Circuit stated that
“[e]ven if the arbitrator applied the wrong standard, which we need
not decide, no manifest disregard for the law has been shown, and
253
Brown’s argument fails.”
It is impossible to know whether the arbitrator in Brown properly
applied the standard for retaliation or not, and that is the problem. By
declining to consider the possibility of legal error, the Eleventh
Circuit gave that arbitrator and others the freedom to deviate from
legal standards. Some arbitrators, including perhaps the one in
Brown, will take up that offer. To the extent they fail to find
discrimination where the law requires, they create a waiver of legal
rights that would not be permissible if done by contract.
Similar issues can arise in other common arbitration situations.
Providers of medical services have begun to put arbitration clauses
254
into the agreements that patients must sign upon admission.
255
Courts have been reluctant to enforce those agreements.
But they
have left the door open to arbitration of medical malpractice claims as
248

211 F.3d 1217, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1220.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 1220-21.
252 Id. at 1223.
253 Id.
254 See Ann H. Nevers, Medical Malpractice Arbitration in the New Millennium: Much
Ado About Nothing? 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 45, 51-52 (2000) (noting that while the
“percentage of physicians using [arbitration] agreements was small, it was increasing”).
255 See, e.g., Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1016-17
(Ariz. 1992) (refusing to enforce an agreement requiring a patient to arbitrate her medical
malpractice claim against her physician because the agreement appeared in a contract of
adhesion and did not involve a conspicuous and explicit waiver of the right to a jury trial).
249
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long as the agreement appeared to be voluntary and the arbitration
256
None of the cases has discussed the
panel was not biased.
possibility of arbitral error. Because the provision of medical care is
a public service under contract law, an agreement to absolve a
medical provider of its negligence would be unenforceable. An
arbitral award that erroneously failed to award damages for
malpractice would have the same effect.
257
Finally, arbitration is increasing in the consumer context.
Financial institutions have been especially aggressive in putting
258
These are
arbitration clauses into their standard form contracts.
classic contracts of adhesion. The banks have much greater
bargaining power than the customers and offer the contracts on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. If these contracts contained provisions
waiving the bank’s liability, they would be closely scrutinized by
259
And in fact courts do sometimes hold the arbitration
courts.
clauses unenforceable when the clauses appear inordinately biased
260
261
But courts frequently uphold those clauses,
toward the bank.
and again, they have not addressed the possibility of arbitral error.
Because it provides no effective controls over arbitrators, the law
of arbitration allows parties to avoid legal rules in ways that they are
not permitted under contract law. If the parties could not enter into a
contract in which an employee agreed to forgo the right to be free
from discrimination, to take one provocative example, then it makes
no sense to uphold an “arbitral construction” of their agreement that
produced the same result. If anything, the arbitration case is worse,
because the party cannot know at the time of contracting exactly what
256 See Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 210-11 & n.45 (1996) (citing cases allowing arbitration of
malpractice claims). But see Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1016-17.
257 See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 (2004).
258 See id.
259 See, e.g., Turnbough v. Ladner, 754 So. 2d 467, 469 (Miss. 1999) (stating that courts
will subject exculpatory language to close judicial scrutiny) (citations omitted); Alack v.
Vic Tanny Int’l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. 1996) (stating that future waivers
of liability will be strictly construed against the party claiming the waiver). See generally
Ann Springer, Releases: An Added Measure of Protection from Liability, 39 BAYLOR L.
REV. 487 (1987) (explaining liability releases).
260 See Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 567 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
261 See Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1035 (S.D.
Miss. 2000); Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 926 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
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The courts have simply failed to

IV
PARTY AUTONOMY AND J UDICIAL REVIEW: IDENTIFYING THE
ALTERNATIVE THE PARTIES BARGAINED FOR
Taken to its logical conclusion, my contract law argument entails a
heightened standard of review for any arbitral award raising the sorts
of issues implicated by the law of exculpatory contracts. Certainly
the simplest way to address the potential for improper avoidance of
legal rules through arbitration is to require de novo judicial review of
all mandatory legal rules raised in arbitration. A number of scholars
concerned about the loss of due process entailed by binding
arbitration of public law disputes have argued for that result. In his
critique of the privatization of law through arbitration, Professor
Stephen Ware argued that courts must either refuse to enforce
agreements to arbitrate disputes implicating mandatory legal rules or
262
Other
require de novo review of awards in those cases.
commentators have suggested applying standards of review that fall
between the current policy of complete deference and a de novo
standard. A typical example would require vacatur if an award
263
“egregiously departs from established legal principles.”
Despite its logical appeal, the solution of heightening standards of
review across the board—either to a de novo or some lesser
standard—is neither practicable nor desirable. It is impracticable
because of courts’ overwhelming embrace of unreviewable
arbitration. To this point, courts have shown little interest in
expanding their oversight role with respect to arbitration. While a
limited increase in judicial review may be feasible, a dramatic and
broad increase is not. And even if courts were willing to take on a
greater oversight role, an across-the-board increase in judicial review
would not be desirable because it would unnecessarily constrict party
autonomy in the selection of dispute resolution processes.
Although we say that parties cannot agree to avoid the operation of
mandatory legal rules, in fact, they do so routinely. That is precisely
what settlement entails. Adjudication is, in most instances, a zerosum game. Courts resolve disputes by finding that the parties either

262
263

See Ware, supra note 13, at 704.
Poser, supra note 130, at 473.
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264

did or did not violate their legal duties.
When parties settle
lawsuits, they agree to avoid those determinations. They agree, in
other words, to an outcome different from the one that would be
265
produced by the application of legal rules through adjudication.
Only in rare cases do courts scrutinize settlements, even when the
266
Every time they settle a
claims involve mandatory legal rules.
claim involving mandatory legal rules in a way that does not match
the adjudicative outcome that would have resulted, the parties have
agreed to avoid the law.
We seem to be comfortable with those outcomes for several
reasons. Settlements come after legal rights have matured. At that
point in the process, we assume that the parties have full information
267
Furthermore, we
regarding the rights they might be forgoing.
assume that the structure of the system—particularly the availability
of contingency fee arrangements—ensures a relatively level playing
268
The agreement to avoid
field on which the parties can negotiate.
the operation of legal rules has relatively strong indicia of
voluntariness. Parties can sometimes be bludgeoned into settlement
of meritorious claims by threats of protracted and expensive

264 For a general critique of this feature of adjudication, see John E. Coons, Approaches
to Court Imposed Compromise—The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 NW. U. L. REV. 750
(1964).
265 This is true even when the parties consciously construct settlement parameters based
on the likely adjudicative outcome. In setting reservation prices for use in negotiating a
settlement, the parties derive an expected value for the case by multiplying the expected
recovery by the likelihood of achieving that recovery. See Russell Korobkin, A Positive
Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1792-93 (2000). That expected value is
not the actual expected recovery in that case. It is, instead, the average recovery that could
be expected if the case were litigated many times.
See RUSSELL KOROBKIN,
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 46 (2002). However, it probably does not reflect
the real consequences of application of the salient legal rules in any one case.
266 See, e.g., Antitrust Penalties & Procedures Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (2000)
(requiring a judge to decide whether antitrust settlements proposed by the United States
are “in the public interest”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A) (requiring court approval for
settlement of class actions).
267 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?:
A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2677 (1995)
(“Even those settlements that actively and intentionally seem to depart from the law are
accomplished precisely because a potential legal result has been considered (and is, thus,
still a reference point) and has been rejected.”).
268 But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076-77 (1984). Fiss
argues that power imbalances often result in coerced settlements. Id. The availability of
contingent fees does not fully rectify those imbalances because contingent fees are
available only to plaintiffs and only in certain types of cases. Id. at 1077.
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litigation.
But the availability of contingency fees and the default
rule requiring each party to pay its own attorneys’ fees reduce
concerns about coerced settlements.
It is a very different thing for parties to agree prospectively—
before their rights have accrued—to forgo legal rights. The parties
lack complete information at that point, and the potential for power
imbalances may make the waiver of rights only nominally voluntary.
Thus, for example, parties cannot agree prior to the accrual of a cause
of action to extend a statute of limitations, but they can agree to
270
extend the limitations period after the cause of action has accrued.
Arbitration presents a case somewhere between the extremes of
settlement on the one hand and explicit prospective waiver of rights
on the other. My premise that parties may be understood to have
agreed ex ante on the terms of the award ultimately rendered by the
arbitrator is a fiction. In fact, the parties undoubtedly go into the
arbitration hoping for a favorable decision, and many times they get
it. When they agree to arbitrate, they do not agree to forgo their
rights. Instead they agree to accept the chance that they will forgo
their rights. This choice is problematic, but it is less problematic than
an express waiver of rights in an exculpatory agreement would be.
Concerns about the waiver of legal rights through arbitration can
be addressed with a relatively modest change in judicial approach to
confirmation of awards. First, the cases on exculpatory contracts
offer guidance as to the kinds of cases in which the prospective
waiver of legal rights raises sufficient concerns to warrant a
heightened standard of review. Waivers that amount to consent to an
intentional injury, involve the provision of public services, or occur
between parties with dramatically different bargaining power raise
special concerns. On the other hand, where these factors are not
present, waivers of legal rights may promote social goals including
efficiency and conservation of judicial resources.
Further, the Supreme Court’s arbitration cases suggest a division
between statutory rules on the one hand, and procedural and commonlaw rules on the other. In discussing the requirement that arbitrators
apply legal rules, the Court has focused entirely on statutory
commands, such as those contained in the securities laws, the antitrust

269

See id. at 1075.
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 201 (McKinney 2005) (“An action . . . must be commenced
within the time specified in this article unless a different time is prescribed by law or a
shorter time is prescribed by written agreement.”) (emphasis added).
270
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laws, the discrimination laws, and RICO. It has never admonished
arbitrators to follow procedural or common-law rules in the same
way.
Statutory rights have, correspondingly, become a focal point for
271
scholars calling for greater judicial scrutiny of awards.
While a
272
focus on statutory rights may come at a cost in analytic principle, it
simplifies the process of determining when additional judicial review
is warranted and narrows the range of cases in which that review will
273
A proposal that targets only statutory rights thus has a
occur.
better chance of acceptance and implementation than one that
addresses mandatory rules more generally. For that reason, I suggest
that arbitral awards implicating procedural and common-law rules
should receive little or no additional scrutiny, while those implicating
statutory rules merit greater solicitude.
These principles suggest a flexible approach to the problem of law
avoidance through arbitration. Rather than adopting a heightened
standard of review in all cases, courts need to treat cases differently
depending first on the legal rules involved, and then on the
relationship of the parties and the nature of their dispute. Only cases
implicating statutory rules of the kind disfavored in the law governing
exculpatory contracts warrant any additional judicial review. Where
those important statutory rights are at issue and the parties have
entered into an agreement to arbitrate, I propose a three-level
approach to judicial review. The approach turns on whether the
parties are of equal or unequal bargaining power and whether the

271 See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal
Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 157, 210 (1989).
Professor Speidel argues that courts should not be precluded from reviewing an
arbitrator’s decision determining federal statutory rights. Id. However, he would preclude
review when it can be shown that the arbitral procedures were substantially similar to
those used in litigation, and the arbitrator actually decided the facts and the legal
questions. Id.
272 See Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach
to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1076 (1987). “It is evident that
there is no necessary distinction between the substance of common law and statutory
provisions.” Id.
273 Cf. Ware, supra note 13, at 732-33.
Professor Ware argues that the proper
distinction is between mandatory and default rules. Id. In other words, he would apply a
heightened standard of review to any rules—whether statutory or common-law—that are
not waivable under the law of contract. See id. His position has logical appeal. I have not
adopted it for reasons that are purely pragmatic: I believe the proposal that has the best
chance for adoption is the one that calls for the least change from the status quo.
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circumstances suggest the existence of an ongoing relationship.
Using these factors, I place arbitrations in three categories: (1) those
in which the parties have roughly equal bargaining power and are in
an ongoing relationship, (2) those in which the parties have roughly
equal bargaining power but no ongoing relationship, and (3) those in
which the parties have substantially unequal bargaining power.
My objective in categorizing arbitrations this way is to find criteria
that can serve as useful indicators of party intent. We can assume
parties choose arbitration at least because they desire an alternative to
formal adjudicative process. The question then becomes the extent to
which the parties seek, voluntarily and with full information, an
alternative to law. I will suggest different standards of review that
should presumptively apply to the arbitrations in these classes.
For purposes of this discussion, I will assume that the parties have
substantially disparate bargaining power whenever one side has no
meaningful opportunity to influence the terms of the agreement.
Given this definition, unequal bargaining power would exist with
respect to all contracts of adhesion, including consumer contracts
relating to everything from computer equipment to financial services
to medical care. It would also exist with respect to any employment
contract in which the employee has insufficient leverage to materially
affect the terms of the agreement.
I measure the existence of an ongoing relationship as of the time of
the arbitration rather than the time of contracting. If the parties
contemplated an ongoing relationship in the contract, but the
relationship has soured past the point of reconciliation, then creative
remedies an arbitrator might otherwise attempt to find become
extraneous. The contract is, in effect, modified, and the arbitrator
should take that fact into account.
A. Equal Bargaining Power, Ongoing Relationship
Formal adjudication is by its nature a combative enterprise.
Success depends on proving that the other side either did something
wrong or is wrong in alleging that it suffered a remediable harm. A
certain amount of bitterness is almost certain to result from such a

274 See Hugh Baxter, Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 50 B UFF.
L. REV. 205, 278 (2002) (“The parallel in the bargaining situation is that the parties must
have ‘equal opportunity for pressure,’ that is, equal bargaining power.”). See generally
Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (2005)
(discussing bargaining power and the effects of unequal bargaining power).
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contest. For that reason, people who have an interest in maintaining a
relationship have especially powerful reasons for seeking alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration.
Parties in that situation normally will want more than just an
alternative to formal adjudicative processes. They will also want an
alternative to the application of legal rules, because legal rules tend to
provide binary solutions. Rather than hoping for a finding that a
contracting partner committed fraud, for instance, parties to these
disputes often want a restructuring of their relationship that will
produce mutual benefits. When their negotiations break down, they
want a neutral to supply the terms that they should have agreed to—
whether or not those terms would be the ones the law would require.
As long as the parties have roughly equivalent bargaining power,
there is no good reason to bar parties in this situation from avoiding
law through arbitration.
The two contexts in which arbitration has historically thrived
most—commercial disputes and labor–management relations—fit this
paradigm. In both contexts, most of the time the parties bring
bargaining power to the table and anticipate further interaction. They
have reason to minimize conflict even if that means forgoing certain
legal rights to which they might be entitled.
Not coincidentally, this situation—parties with equal bargaining
power in an ongoing relationship—seems to be the one that best fits
within the statutory structure of the FAA. Where it is appropriate for
the parties to avoid law, the only review required under the FAA is
what is necessary to make sure that the arbitrator does not exceed his
275
authority, possess bias, or direct the parties to do something illegal.
If arbitration were limited to commercial disputes and labor–
management relations, this level of review would be entirely
appropriate. But it is not. As arbitration has expanded, the parties to
arbitration agreements may lack either or both equal bargaining
power and an ongoing relationship.
B. Equal Bargaining Power, No Ongoing Relationship
Frequently parties with equal bargaining power will choose
arbitration in the absence of an ongoing relationship. Commercial
disputes fall into this class where the parties have a finite agreement
or where the relationship has irreparably deteriorated. Large investors

275

See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000 & Supp. II 2001-2003).
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and their securities brokers may also find themselves in this situation,
as may powerful employees and their employers.
In these cases, there is reason to think that the parties selected
arbitration voluntarily and with full information. To that extent, it
makes sense to treat the arbitrator’s award as a manifestation of the
parties’ mutual intent. This class is different from the first class,
however, because the parties have less incentive to avoid the
adversarialism of adjudication. Without the lure of benefits from
future dealings, the parties will frequently want a declaration of their
rights and obligations, and they may expect the arbitrator to provide
one. At least some of the time, the parties will see the outcome of the
arbitration as a win for one and a loss for the other. To that extent, it
makes less sense to treat the award as a manifestation of the parties’
mutual intent.
Still, if arbitrations falling in the first class call for the minimum in
judicial review, arbitrations in this class call for only slightly more.
One important reason why parties have traditionally selected
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism is that they want a
decision maker who will apply industry standards instead of legal
rules. Among merchants, for example, certain disputes are resolved
almost exclusively with arbitrators who apply customary standards
276
In many cases, these disputants want a
rather than legal rules.
decision maker to determine who is right and who is wrong, but they
do not want that decision to be made by reference to legal rules.
For these arbitrations, the manifest disregard test should
supplement the “essence” test and the public policy ground as an
additional standard of judicial review. Under the manifest disregard
test, as it is most commonly understood, an award may be disturbed
277
only if the arbitrator acknowledges a legal rule and then ignores it.
Where parties have roughly equal bargaining power, it makes sense to
assume that they voluntarily and knowingly entrust their dispute to
the arbitrator. If the arbitrator chooses not to decide the dispute by
reference to generally applicable legal rules, the parties may be
understood to acquiesce in that choice. On the other hand, if the
arbitrator chooses to apply legal rules, the parties may be understood
to demand that he or she actually apply them. In such a case, the

276 See William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York:
A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L. Q. 193, 218-19.
277 See Poser, supra note 130, at 504-05.
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manifest disregard of the legal rules would contravene the parties’
intentions.
C. Unequal Bargaining Power
Increasingly, arbitration clauses appear in agreements between
parties with dramatically different bargaining power, whether or not
278
This class includes
they are engaged in an ongoing relationship.
most consumer arbitrations, including most securities arbitrations, and
a great many employer–employee arbitrations. These are the cases in
which the contractarian model of arbitration is least apposite. Almost
by definition, the parties have different interests, so the “agent” of one
cannot simultaneously be the “agent” of the other, as the contractarian
model assumes.
The courts have moved far beyond the point at which the
enforceability of arbitration agreements in these situations is open to
serious question. The Supreme Court is firmly committed to
arbitration as an alternative to formal adjudication. It has refused to
entertain arguments that arbitration is an inadequate substitute even
279
As a matter of arbitration doctrine, an
for contracts of adhesion.
agreement to arbitrate amounts to a statement of the parties’ intention
to avoid formal adjudication.
But the agreement to forgo formal adjudication does not
necessarily entail an agreement to forgo the application of legal rules.
This is the point at which the prevailing model of judicial review
breaks down. In cases in which the parties to an agreement to
arbitrate have significantly disparate bargaining power, a presumption
should apply that the parties desire some minimal level of substantive
judicial review to protect against clear errors of law.
The question, of course, is what level of review to apply. Giving
courts the power to review the legal decisions of arbitrators de
novo—as appellate courts review trial judges’ decisions on legal
issues—would effectively defeat arbitration as an effective alternative
to formal adjudication. Any party disappointed with the award could
subject the other party to the equivalent of a formal appeal in virtually
any case. This result could, in the end, hurt the weaker party more
278 Where there is such a disparity of bargaining power, the stronger party will have the
ability to dictate the terms of the agreement, including the possibility of extending the
relationship. Thus, the contemplation of an ongoing relationship cannot be assumed to be
voluntary and mutually intended.
279 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
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than the stronger. Some studies have shown that arbitration is good
for employees with discrimination claims, for example, because its
low cost allows the pursuit of smaller or more speculative claims that
no plaintiff’s lawyer operating on a contingency fee would pursue in
280
That advantage could be lost if every employee who won in
court.
arbitration faced the prospect of a further round of litigation in court.
But some lower standard of review could ensure basic compliance
with legal rules while retaining the effectiveness of arbitration.
Several other lower standards would suffice. For example, trial
judges review the decisions of juries by asking whether a reasonable
281
jury could decide the way the jury decided.
Appellate courts
review the factual determinations of trial judges by asking whether
282
Courts review the
the judge abused his or her discretion.
determinations of administrative agencies by asking whether the
283
It is not clear what
agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious.
difference, if any, there is among these standards. Each requires
deference to the lower decision maker, and each applies some version
of a test of rationality. Any of the three could be adopted, as could an
explicit rationality standard. The exact wording of the test is not
especially significant as long as the court has the power to correct
clear and important errors of law.
Implicit in this discussion is the principle that the arbitrator’s
factual findings should be free from judicial review outside of the
traditional grounds. The arbitrator’s factual findings provide the
background for his or her decision on the parties’ rights and
responsibilities. Under a contractarian model, those findings are the
equivalent of the recitals in a contract. Contract law prevents parties
from bargaining away certain legal rights in certain circumstances. It
says nothing about the factual premises on which the parties base
their agreements.

280 See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559,
563-64 (2001).
281 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL P ROCEDURE § 13.4 (4th ed. 2005)
(describing the nature and scope of review).
282 Id.
283 See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 & n.23 (1989) (stating
that the applicable standard of review for administrative agency determinations is the
arbitrary and capricious standard); Neiman v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
722 F. Supp. 954, 957 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (reviewing the administrative agency’s
determination under the arbitrary and capricious standard).
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Even though courts have no reason to review the arbitrator’s
factual findings, my proposal would require arbitrators to
memorialize their factual findings and legal conclusions in order to
allow for meaningful judicial review of the legal issues. There seems
284
but it represents a change
to be a trend in this direction anyway,
from traditional practice, in which arbitrators were expressly
285
From my
encouraged not to create a reviewable record.
perspective, this change would be a positive one. The requirement of
writing a reasoned opinion has long served as an important guarantor
of adjudicative fairness. Where arbitrators are called on to decide the
sorts of statutory issues traditionally reserved for courts, and the
parties’ relationship indicates an intention to apply legal rules to the
dispute, the arbitrators should provide reasons for their decisions.
The heightened standard of review I propose should apply
regardless of the terms purportedly agreed upon in the arbitration
clause. Again, my argument is that the parties should not be
permitted to prospectively waive their rights to the application of
statutory rules in these cases. That is, they should not be able to
contract away judicial review even if they attempt to do so expressly
in the agreement.
On the other hand, once the rights in question have matured and the
parties have reached the point of arbitration, the waiver calculus
changes. A waiver of rights after a legal cause of action has matured
is simply a settlement. If the parties mutually decide to give an
arbitrator the freedom to disregard the law at that point—or if they
simply want to guarantee that their dispute will not reach a court—
their wishes should be honored unless a settlement in similar
286
The heightened standard of
circumstances would be disallowed.
284 See Covington, supra note 13, at 394-95 (citing various recommendations for
written opinions in at least some types of arbitrations). See also Christopher B.
Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public Law Arbitrators Should Be
Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 285, 287
(2000) (arguing for written, publicly available opinions in cases involving issues of public
law).
285 See American Arbitration Ass’n Guide for Commercial Arbitrators (2006),
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22016. The AAA Guide makes clear that arbitrators are not
required to provide written opinions, emphasizing that “a carelessly expressed thought in a
written opinion could afford an opportunity to delay enforcement of the award. The
obligations to the parties are better fulfilled when the award leaves no room for attack.”
Id.
286 Cf. Ware, supra note 13, at 728-29. Professor Ware argues for de novo review of
awards implicating mandatory legal rules but not for postdispute agreements to arbitrate.
See also Ware, Interstate Arbitration, supra note 22, at 111.
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review, then, should apply presumptively only. Courts should assume
that they have an obligation to review arbitral determinations on
statutory rules of law for irrationality (or some comparable standard)
unless the parties expressly agree to a different standard after their
dispute reaches the point of arbitration.
That raises the question of whether parties can dictate terms of
review to courts. There is no clear consensus on this issue. Several
circuits, most prominently the Ninth Circuit in Kyocera Corp. v.
287
Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., have held that parties may
not contract for judicial review beyond that contained in section 10 of
288
Other circuits, including the Fourth and Fifth, allow the
the FAA.
289
All the cases raising this
parties to contract for additional review.
issue involve attempts by parties to heighten the review that a court
would otherwise provide. My proposal does not necessarily implicate
those cases. I am arguing that review for irrationality or arbitrariness
should be part of courts’ residual common-law authority over
arbitration. If parties want a degree of review more exacting, then
290
But my primary concern is
they run into the Kyocera line of cases.
that parties have the freedom to avoid judicial review if they so
desire. Just as parties are normally free to opt out of litigation by
choosing arbitration in the first instance, so they should be free to opt
out of judicial review of arbitral awards as long as they do so after the
291
legal rights in question have matured.

287

341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
See also Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 940 (10th Cir. 2001). The
Seventh and Eighth Circuits have suggested in dicta that parties should not be entitled to
contract for heightened review. See UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d
992, 998 (8th Cir. 1998); Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times,
Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991).
289 See Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 592-93 (5th Cir. 2001); Syncor
Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248, at *17 (4th Cir.
Aug. 11, 1997).
290 See generally Jonathan R. Bunch, Arbitration Clauses Should Be Enforced
According to Their Terms—Except When They Shouldn’t Be: The Ninth Circuit Limits
Parties’ Ability to Contract for Standards of Review of Arbitration Awards, 2004 J. DISP.
RESOL. 461 (discussing conflicting case law on parties’ right to contract for higher
standard of review than provided in FAA).
291 There is a fundamental difference between contracting for judicial review and
contracting to avoid judicial review. Parties cannot contract to give courts power to hear
claims that are beyond the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Chicago
Typographical, 935 F.2d at 1505 (“[Parties] cannot contract for judicial review of [an
arbitral] award; federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.”). But they are
normally free to waive their rights to adjudicative process. For example, parties can forgo
288
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CONCLUSION
The argument I have made in this Article rests on a particular way
of conceptualizing arbitration. I take a model that sees the arbitrator
as the parties’ agent for interpreting their agreement, what I call the
contractarian model, and tease out the implications that follow from a
rigorous application of that model. I assume that the arbitrator’s
award may be understood as equivalent to a contract term agreed
upon by the parties ex ante. I then argue that if the award would be
unenforceable as an exculpatory contract if its terms were included in
the agreement, it does not deserve the extreme judicial deference
normally applied. I suggest that a presumptively higher, although still
quite deferential, standard of review should apply when an arbitration
involves parties whose relationship raises concerns about the
prospective waiver of legal rights.
The contractarian model is merely one way of conceptualizing
arbitration. For an observer who sees arbitration simply as private
adjudication, the model loses force and so does my argument. I have
explained why I believe the contractarian model is a valid and useful
way of understanding arbitration. But I want to emphasize that I
believe the adoption of a private adjudication model would raise even
more fundamental concerns. This is an argument convincingly made
by Richard Rueben, who has contended that arbitration, in at least
some cases, is an aspect of public justice to which due process rights
292
must apply.
My objective, in part, is to demonstrate that these
concerns do not disappear if arbitration is conceptualized as a species
of contract rather than adjudication.
Understandable frustration with high litigation costs, crowded
court dockets, and unpredictable juries has led to the judicial embrace
of essentially unreviewable arbitration. The change in judicial
attitudes and the corresponding expansion of arbitration have
jurisdiction in a particular court by agreeing to a forum selection clause. See
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 281, § 3.5.
292 See Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 609-41 (1997). Moreover, other commentators
have made similar arguments without expressly equating arbitration with adjudication.
See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference
for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and
Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1997). But see MedValUSA Health
Programs, Inc. v. MemberWorks, Inc., 872 A.2d 423, 428 (Conn. 2005) (holding that a
judicially confirmed arbitration award granting punitive damages is exempt from due
process limits because judicial confirmation is not a state action).
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occurred very rapidly. As a result, the full implications of the
arbitration-based dispute resolution system have not been explored.
This Article points out one significant way in which the modern law
of arbitration clashes with bedrock principles of contract law. It
cannot and does not pretend to answer the many policy questions
raised by the growth of arbitration. But it provides a concrete
doctrinal reason why courts need to be more active in their scrutiny of
arbitral awards than they have become accustomed to.

